A critical analysis of the financial regulation of private equity investments in South Africa by Kudanga, Annah
  
FACULTY OF LAW  
 
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF 
PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
  
Student Number:   Annah Kudanga  
Student Number:      3258571  
 
 
A mini-thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the M.Phil 
degree in the Department of Mercantile Law 
  
  
  Supervisor:      Professor M.S. Wandrag  
  
2015 
 
 
 
 
 
i 
 
KEY WORDS 
The following key words, expressions and terms are used in this mini-thesis:  
 
 
Bewind Trusts 
 
En commandite Partnerships 
 
Financial Regulation 
 
Initial Public Offering 
 
Legal and Regulatory Framework 
 
Private Equity  
 
South Africa 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
B-BBEE Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment 
BVCA  British Venture Capital Association 
CGT  Capital Gains Tax 
MOI  Memorandum of Incorporation 
JSE  Johannesburg Stock Exchanges 
FAIS  Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
FMA  Financial Markets Act 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
GP  General Partners 
IOSCO International Organization for the Securities Commission 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
IPO  Initial Public Offering 
JSE  Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
LP  Limited Partners 
PEI  Private Equity Investment 
PFA  Pension Fund Act 
SA  South Africa 
ITA  Income Tax Act 1962 
UK  United Kingdom 
USA  United States of America 
VC  Venture Capital 
DECLARATION  
I, Annah Kudanga, declare that A Critical Analysis of the Financial Regulation of Private 
Equity Investments in South Africa is my own work and that it has not been submitted before 
for any degree or examination in any other university, and that all sources I have used or quoted 
have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.  
  
Signed   
 
  
Annah Kudanga  
  
June 2015  
   
Signed   
 
                   Professor M.S. Wandrag  
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
  
I would like to thank God, for all His blessings.  
 
To my supervisor, Prof Wandrag, baie dankie for the opportunity to undertake this project, and 
for the excellent supervision and guidance throughout the course of my study. I am also grateful 
to Professor Israel Leeman, for all the advice and valuable contribution to my work.  
 
To my parents, Mr and Mrs Panganai, I would like to thank you for your prayers, encouragement 
and support throughout my life. I am also most grateful to my siblings, Athanas, Abigail and 
Anthony who have provided me with moral support during this study. I treasure the memories 
and you certainly made my days brighter.  
 
I am most grateful to my husband Tukayi Kudanga. Thank you for the encouragement to pursue 
this Mphil programme, love and moral support.  
 
Finally, I would also like to thank The University of the Western Cape for giving me the 
opportunity to pursue this programme and undertake this research. 
 
DEDICATION  
  
I affectionately dedicate this work to my twin boys Brandon and Bradley  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
 
KEY WORDS          i 
LIST OF ACRONYMS         i 
DECLARATION          ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS         iii 
DEDICATION          iii 
ABSTRACT           vii 
CHAPTER 1           1 
1.1 Background          1 
1.2 Statement of the problem         7 
1.3 Research question          8 
1.4 Principal aims and objectives of the study      8 
1.5 Significance of the study         9 
1.6 Methodology          10 
1.7 Limitation of the scope         10 
1.8 Overview of chapters         11 
CHAPTER 2           12 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH    
AFRICA           12 
2.1 Introduction          12 
2.2 Private equity legal structures in South Africa      13 
2.2.1. En commandite Partnerships        13 
2.2.2  Bewind trusts          19 
2.3 Conclusion          21 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
CHAPTER 3           24 
THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA           24 
3.1 Introduction          24 
3.2 The financial regulation legal framework in South Africa    25 
3.2.1 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act     26 
3.2.2 The Pension funds Act of 1956        29 
3.2.3 The Broad–based Economic Empowerment Act of 2003    32 
3.2.4 The Companies Act 71 of 2008        35 
3.2.5 Competition Act 89 of 1998        38 
3.2.6 The Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012 and JSE Listing Requirements  39 
3.2.7 The King Reports         41 
3.2.8 The Exchange Control Regulations 1961      43 
3.3 Conclusion          44 
CHAPTER 4           47 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND  
THE UNITED KINGDOM         47 
 
4.1 Introduction          47 
4.2 Regulation of private equity investment in the United Kingdom in comparison with South 
Africa            49 
4.2.1 Brief view of the private equity legal structure in the United Kingdom  49 
4.2.2 The Financial Conduct Authority       53 
4.2.3 The Criminal Justice Act 1993        54 
4.2.4 The EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers    56 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
4.2.5 The Bribery Act 2010         57 
4.2.6 The UK Companies Act 2006        59 
4.2.7 The Walker Guidelines         60 
4.3 SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 
REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS     61 
4.3.1 The Money Laundering Regulations       61 
4.3.2 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers       62 
4.4 Conclusion          63 
CHAPTER 5           66 
IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA ON PRIVATE 
EQUITY INVESTMENTS         66 
5.1 Introduction          66 
5.2 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002    67 
5.3 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003    68 
5.4 En commandite partnerships        70 
5.5 Conclusion          71 
CHAPTER 6           73 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS      73 
6.1 Conclusion          73 
6.2 Recommendations         74 
6.2.1 Industry Guidelines         75 
6.2.2 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act     76 
6.2.3 Regulation of the private equity legal structure      77 
6.2.4 Listing private equity funds        79 
BIBLIOGRAPHY          80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
ABSTRACT    
Private equity is a critical vehicle of entrepreneurship development that is essential in reducing 
unemployment and boosting the economic growth of South Africa. There has, however, been a decline in 
private equity investment (PEI) activity in South Africa compared to the 2006-2007 peak and seed capital 
by venture capitalists has been affected the most. This has been attributed to a number of factors mainly 
related to financial and tax regulation. This study critically reviews the financial regulation of the PEIs in 
South Africa with a view to elucidating potential pitfalls that may be affecting the competitiveness of the 
industry. A comparison with the regulation of PEIs in the United Kingdom (which is generally regarded 
as functioning well) is also made in order to provide a basis for recommendations to improve private 
equity activity in South Africa. The main legal structures for PEIs in South Africa are the en commandite 
partnerships and the bewind trusts, of which en commandite partnerships are the most common legal 
structure. The private equity industry is mainly regulated by common law. However, there are various, 
separate sections of legislation that regulate private equity transactions as well as public companies. 
These fragmented pieces of legislation and regulations include the Financial Advisory and Intermediary 
Services Act, the Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act and the Black Economic 
Empowerment policy framework, the Companies Act, the Pension Funds Act, the Financial Markets Act, 
the Exchange Control Regulations 1961, the Competition Act, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Listing 
Requirements and the King Reports on Corporate Governance. Of these, the most influential is the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act which regulates financial service providers or fund 
managers. A comparison with the PEIs regulatory framework in the UK showed that the UK, apart from 
having a consolidated legislation regulating the legal structure of PEIs, generally, has a more 
comprehensive scope of regulation that includes self-regulation, co-regulation, and regional regulations, 
in addition to the traditional, conservative common law. This integration of regional requirements through 
EU’s Directive 2011/61/EU and the Walker Guidelines has probably helped the UK to open up new 
markets in the region. Although there are some positives in the regulation of PEIs in South Africa, 
notably the regulation of financial markets to prevent market abuse and insider trading, it appears 
financial regulation may benefit from drawing lessons from the law and regulatory framework of the UK. 
It is therefore recommended that the South African private equity industry develops a consolidated and 
facilitative regulatory framework. This can be based on co-regulation along the lines of the Walker 
Guidelines (which encourages more disclosure and transparency) as well as a consolidated Act to control 
all PEIs activities.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1 BACKGROUND 
 
Private Equity Investments (PEIs) are financial intermediaries that contribute immensely to the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
1
 and the economic growth of South Africa (SA) through the 
‘provision of equity capital to companies that are generally not listed on a public stock 
exchange.’2 Over the years, the interest in the private equity market has increased because of the 
fact that PEIs experienced constantly higher returns than other more conventional forms of 
investments.
3
 The private equity industry in SA does not have a single regulator or private equity 
legislation that ‘exercises regulatory oversight over its funds.’4 However, there are various, 
separate pieces of legislation and regulations that monitor private equity transactions as well as public 
companies. Since the inception of PEIs in the late 1980s in SA financial regulations that govern 
the industry
5
 have evolved, and various other provisions have been introduced or amended that 
have impacted the performance of the industry. 
 
The most important legislation influencing the private equity industry is the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (the Constitution). The democratic value system sought by the 
Constitution is entrenched in the Bill of Rights (BOR) that embodies the legal values of dignity, 
equality and freedom as fundamental rights of every South African.
6
 The Constitution advocates 
                                               
1  Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
2  Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
3  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries- 
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014).  
4  Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
5  Johnson DA Private Equity in Africa: An Evolving Market (2013) 5. 
6  the Constitution. 
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for core democratic values that influence every facet of PEIs such as basic human rights,
7
 
essential labour and employment rights,
8
 as well as environmental rights,
 9
 making SA one of the 
few countries globally to have environmental rights in its constitution. It also provides for 
affirmative action as the right to equality and equal access to opportunities.
10
  
 
The democratic SA that emerged after 1994 sought to resolve economic disparities through the 
introduction of new legislation such as the Black Economic Empowerment
11
 (BEE) that was 
enacted in 2003
12
 and was strategically modified in 2007 to become the Broad-based Black 
Economic Empowerment Act 
13
(B-BBEE Act). The shift by SA from the shareholder to the 
stakeholder model of corporate governance propelled legislation which provides for community 
development,
14
 improved employee housing, affirmative procurement and ownership of shares 
by the previously disadvantaged black people.
15
 The South African PEIs now had to take 
cognisance and adhere to the B-BBEE statutory policy framework that was aimed at enabling 
more ‘economic participation by Black, historically disadvantaged individuals through the 
attainment of equity ownership or management of an investee company or both.’16 Currently the 
‘funds under management in PEIs that can be categorised as non-empowered or unrelated to the 
B-BBEE Act account for 25.2 percent of the industry’s total equity.’17 
Corporate governance in the PEIs has not only been influenced by the provisions introduced by 
the Companies Act
18
 but also the King Reports. The King II Report made recommendations that 
were in accordance with legislation, such as, ‘the Employment Equity Act,19 the Skills 
                                               
7  Sections 7-39 the Constitution. 
8  Section 18 and 23 the Constitution. 
9  Section 24 the Constitution.  
10   Sections 8 (2) and (3) the Constitution.  
11  Act 53 of 2003. 
12  Act 53 of 2003. 
13 Act 53 of 2003. 
14  Act 71 of 2008. 
15  Hamann R ‘Corporate social responsibility, partnerships, and institutional change: The case of mining companies in  
South Africa’ (2004) 28 National Resources Forum 280. 
12  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries-  
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014). 
17  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general- 
industries-  publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014).  
18  Act 71 of 2008. 
19 Act 55 of 1998. 
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Development Act
20
 and the BEE Commission Report in SA.’21 This legislation is recognised in 
the King II Report as legislation that observes the concepts of good corporate governance. The 
King III Report mainly recommends that companies report on how they ensure corporate 
longevity or adherence to the triple bottom line requirements which are social, environmental 
and financial requirements.
22
 Private equity transactions take cognisance of the King Code of 
Governance Principles particularly in portfolio companies and when they exit from investments 
through an Initial Public Offering (IPO) as it is a (Johannesburg Stock Exchange) JSE Listing 
requirement.  
In addition, another change in regulations that has contributed immensely to the performance of 
PEIs in SA is the amendment in the laws and regulations of the Pension Funds Act
23
 (PFA) of 
2011. In accordance with the amended Regulation 28 of the South African PFA, ‘pension funds 
can now invest up to 10 % of their assets in private equity funds and up to 15% of their assets in 
hedge funds and private equity funds combined.
24
 The changes and clarification made in 
Regulation 28 of the PFA allow pension funds to invest more in PEIs and therefore drive the 
activities of the private equity industry with the increased capital inflow.
25
 The investment 
periods of PEIs are well-matched with the long-term investment horizons of pension funds 
making it favourable for the industry.
26
 In Europe, it has also been observed that the main 
benefitting ‘institutional investors from the returns made by PEIs and Venture Capital (VC) 
firms have been pension funds, which in the year 2006 was the industry’s biggest source of 
funds.’27 
 
                                               
20 Act 97 of 1998. 
21 Mongalo T ‘The emergence of corporate governance as a fundamental research topic in South Africa’ (2003) 120  
SALJ190 190. 
22  Harvie MA  Analysis of The New Proposed Companies Act Compared To The Old Companies Act 61 of 1973 And The   
King 11 Report on Corporate Governance With Specific Focus On  Directors Liabilities And Responsibilities  
(unpublished MBA thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 2009) 21. 
23  Act 19 of 2011. 
24 Regulation 28 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
25  Missankov I, Van Dyk R & Van Biljon M et al. ‘Is private equity a suitable investment for South African pension   
funds?’ available at    
http://www.itinews.co.za/content/media/companydocs/5f9cc53b-ddf5-4041-8151-2ced3b412681.pdf (accessed 08  
November 2013). 
26  Missankov I, Van Dyk R & Van Biljon M et al. ‘Is private equity a suitable investment for  South African pension  
funds?’ available at   
http://www.itinews.co.za/content/media/companydocs/5f9cc53b-ddf5-4041-8151-2ced3b412681.pdf (accessed 08  
November 2013). 
27  Sahu R, Nath A & Banerjee P ‘Trends in Private Equity and Venture Capital Investments with Special Focus on the   
Booming India Growth Story’ (2009) 4 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 2 129. 
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Since the financial crisis there has been introduction of more laws and regulations that have 
impacted on the activities of SA’s financial institutions and the manner in which they conduct 
business. However, the main regulators responsible for administering applicable legislation on 
private and public sector investments in SA, namely, the Financial Services Board (FSB) has not 
extended this regulation to PEIs. Currently, provided members of the public do not invest in 
PEIs, the FSB does not regulate the structures in which private equity funds are established. In its 
draft on the Specific Code of Conduct of Financial Services Providers and Representatives 
Conducting Financial Services Business with Professional Clients, the FSB explains  that PEIs 
do not require the same amount of regulation, such as, that provided for in the Financial 
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act
28
 (FAIS).  
 
The financial crisis of 2008-2009 was mainly a result of the poor monetary system in the United 
States of America (US), the issuance of sub-prime loans that led to the housing bubble and 
inadequate or lax regulation of the financial markets by the government.
29
 The South African 
financial market weathered the crisis successfully in comparison to the United States, European 
and Asian markets as a result of its concrete financial policies and limited use of complex, 
derivative financial products.
30
 In addition, ‘SA’s banks had minimum equity capital 
requirements before the financial crises that were already at 15% which was almost double the 
international Basel III best practice recommendation of 8%.’31 SA still remains the biggest and 
most established economy in sub-Saharan Africa with comparatively ‘liquid financial markets 
that are well-regulated, sophisticated and sustained by a progressive common law-based legal 
system.’32 According to the 2011/2012 World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness 
Report, SA’s securities exchanges are ranked amongst the top financial markets in the world.33 
Although PEIs aim to provide funds to unlisted private entities, the stability of financial markets 
                                               
28  Act 37 of 2002. 
29  Head JW ‘The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in context- reflections on international legal and 
 institutional failings, fixes and fundamentals’ (2011) 23 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 53. 
30  Financial Regulatory Reform Steering Committee (FRRSC) Implementing A Twin Peaks Model of Financial            
Regulation In South Africa (2013) 15. 
31  Davis K ‘Regulatory reform post the global financial crisis: an overview’ available at   
  http://www.apec.org.au/docs/11_CON_GFC/Regulatory%20Reform%20Post%20GFC-%20Overview%20Paper.pdf    
(accessed 28 February 2014).  
32  Loggerenberg C ‘South Africa’s developing financial markets regulation’ available at  
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3093933/South-Africas-developing-financial-markets-regulation-analysed.html (accessed  
5 November 2014). 
33  Salai-I-Martin X ‘The global competitiveness report 2011-2012’ available at  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GCR_Report_2011-12.pdf (accessed 6 November 2014). 
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influences the industry as an alternative investment destination, in building a positive reputation 
for SA amongst other emerging markets, when conducting buyouts and as an exit platform for 
IPOs. Therefore another change that has influenced PEI activities is the introduction of the 
Financial Markets Act
34
 (FMA) which replaces the Securities Services Act.
35
 The FMA has 
become the main legislation to govern the activities of financial markets, securities services and 
infrastructure of markets in SA.  
PEIs are very important to the economy of SA and can potentially contribute more to the 
prosperity of the country through employment creation and economic growth.
36
 A number of 
scholars argue that the existence of an active private equity and Venture Capital (VC) market in 
an economy allows the efficient allocation of capital and that PEI funds go directly to entities 
where they are most effectively and efficiently used which results in optimal compensation ‘per 
given level of risk.’37 The South African Venture Capital Association (SAVCA) outlines the 
importance of private equity as that; 
“Private equity can be used to develop new products and technologies, to expand 
working capital, to make new acquisitions or to strengthen a company’s balance sheet. It 
can also be used to resolve ownership and management issues, succession in a family-
owned business or the buyout or buy-in of a business by experienced managers.”38 
 
In SA, the social influence of PEIs is essentially related with the B-BBEE through investor 
participation in transactions that promote the B-BBEE.
39
 The PEIs are linked with high 
                                               
34  Act 19 of 2012. 
35 Act 36 of 2004. 
36             Sahu R,  Nath A &  Banerjee P ‘Trends in private equity and venture capital investments with  
special focus on the booming India growth story’ (2009) 4 Journal of International Commercial Law and  
  Technology 2 129. 
37  Portmann D & Mlambo C ‘Private equity and venture capital in South Africa: a comparison of project financing  
decisions’ (2013) 16 SAJEMS 3.   
38  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries-  
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014).   
77  Missankov I, Van Dyk R & Van Biljon M et al. ‘Is private equity a suitable investment for South African pension   
funds?’ available at    
http://www.itinews.co.za/content/media/companydocs/5f9cc53b-ddf5-4041-8151-2ced3b412681.pdf  (accessed 08  
November 2014). 
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investment returns and diversification benefits that present an opportunity to meet the B-BBEE 
objectives.
40
 
 
Respondents in a ‘survey carried out in 2009 by Herrington and Kew and Kew, showed that 81% 
of the participants singled out the lack of capital’ as the biggest challenge in their firms.41 To this 
end, private equity is an essential source of financing for portfolio companies and also 
contributes ‘expertise, networks, alliances and new customers to the firms it funds.’42 Private 
equity’s seed capital targets firms in the introductory phase with high-growth potential concepts, 
products and services. This may be crucial for industries that need to quickly attain and sustain a 
competitive advantage, such as, telecommunications, software, bio-technology and internet 
services.
43
 Another essential feature of private equity is that it provides capital to high-risk firms 
which other lenders would not fund, such as; rapidly growing firms without track records, 
entities that constantly require external financing and companies with financial difficulties.
44
  
  
When private equity funds invest in a company, they retain some control, and can influence the 
composition of management in investee companies. The appointment of the board of directors 
after investing in portfolio companies allows the PEIs to actively implement and monitor the 
strategic and operational plans of the portfolio company. As a result, PEIs have access to the 
companies' assets and income sources, which can allow them to make very high profits.
45
 In 
addition, PEI equity can improve a company's stock price when potential investors speculate that 
a buyout is expected to take place.
46
 Private equity investors’ rank alongside banks, shareholders, 
                                               
40  Missankov I, Van Dyk R & Van Biljon M et al. ‘Is private equity a suitable investment for South African pension   
funds?’ available at    
http://www.itinews.co.za/content/media/companydocs/5f9cc53b-ddf5-4041-8151-2ced3b412681.pdf  (accessed 08  
November 2014). 
41  Portmann D & Mlambo C ‘Private equity and venture capital in South Africa: a comparison of project financing 
decisions’ (2013) 16 SAJEMS 3.   
42   Portmann D & Mlambo C ‘Private equity and venture capital in South Africa: a comparison of project financing 
decisions’ (2013) 16 SAJEMS 3.  
43  Sahu R,  Nath A &  Banerjee P ‘Trends in private equity and venture capital investments with special focus on the   
booming India growth story’ (2009) 4 Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 2 128.  
44  Portmann D & Mlambo C ‘Private equity and venture capital in South Africa: a comparison of project financing  
decisions’ (2013) 16 SAJEMS 3.  
45  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries-  
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014).  
46  Loubser J & Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014).  
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and other lenders but they do not require interest payments on their capital.
47
 For this reason, 
PEIs are particularly focused on ensuring that the firm overcomes its difficulties or makes profit 
as they stand to lose all of their investment if the deals fail. Private equity is also very important 
as it is a source of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in SA, through the raising of offshore funds 
by PEI’s as well as co-investments with foreign investors.48 However, the full potential of PEIs 
can only be fully realised if there is a supportive regulatory framework. 
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Current funds under PEIs management in SA have had an average compound annual growth of 
11.8% since 1999.
49
 Despite the general achievement and popularity in PEIs, there appears to be 
a number of emerging issues or problems militating against the continuing, high growth in the 
sector. In the past six years investments in private equity have declined from the record level and 
historical peak of R15.4 billion in 2007 to R10.7 billion in 2011.
50
 Private equity’s raising of 
funds and the success rate thereof has not returned to the 2006–2007 levels and new investments’ 
average deal size in the PEIs sector went down from ‘R21.2million in 2011 to R19.2 million, in 
2012 while follow-on investments average deal size decreased from R50.6 million, during 2011  
to R26.2 million during 2012.’51 In addition, the average investment deal size decreased from 
R30.7 million for the year 2011 to R21.9 million in the year 2012.
52
 On the contrary, the UK, 
which is one of the worlds’ most established private equity markets had a high fundraising for 
                                               
47  KPMG Africa ‘The promise and obstacles facing private equity investment in Africa’ available at   
http://www.blog.kpmgafrica.com/the-promise-and-obstacles-facing-private-equity-investment-in-africa/ (accessed 05   
November 2014). 
48  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calender year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries- 
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 05 November 2014). 
49  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calender year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries-    
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014).  
50  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
 2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries- 
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014).  
51  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries-  
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014). 
52  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the 
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries-  
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014).  
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the same period.
53
 Since taxes and similar financial regulatory measures generally add a 
significant cost of doing business, most investors regard them as a regulatory constraint that is 
unfavourable for investments.
54
 Although tax regulation is an important factor in the 
performance of PEIs, the area of tax regulation is outside the scope of this mini-thesis. This mini-
thesis seeks to critically analyse the financial regulation of PEIs and benchmark it against that of 
the UK as a way of determining ways of improving financial regulation and possibly the 
performance of the PEIs in SA. The mini-thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
 What is the current structure of the financial regulation of private equity investments in 
SA? 
 What is the current structure of the UK financial regulation of private equity 
investments? 
 Based on the comparative analysis with the UK, what recommendations can be made 
with regards to the financial regulation of private equity investments in SA? 
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
What recommendations can be made regarding the financial regulation of the PEIs in SA, to 
ensure its continued growth, using the UK financial regulatory framework as a benchmark? 
  
1.4 PRINCIPAL AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
 The main objective of this study is to analyse the legal and regulatory framework of PEIs in SA 
with the focus on financial regulation. This was done by looking at regulatory changes that have 
affected PEIs, and also by comparison of the private equity-regulatory activity in SA against a 
benchmark economy of the UK that is known for its attractive financial and tax regime.
55
 Given 
                                               
53  Private Equity International Research and Analytics Quarterly Review (2013). 
54  Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com  
(accessed 19 November 2014). 
55  Delloitte ‘South Africa - at risk of losing private equity investment to other emerging markets’ available at  
http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_za/za/a02ec5275d0fb110VgnVCM100000ba42f00aRCRD.htm (accessed 27 
November 2014). 
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the comparative value of the UK as one of the most developed private equity markets,
56
 this 
study discusses the legal and regulatory framework of private equity in the UK and compares it 
with that of SA in areas such as investors’ rights, company law, stock markets and affirmative 
action. Such a comparative analysis was done in order to single out the areas of focus in the legal 
and regulatory framework in financial regulation that impact private equity activity in SA.  
Although the industry contributes to economic growth in SA, the slow growth of PEIs and VC 
investments is a major cause for concern.
57
 Unfortunately, research on financial regulation of 
PEIs particularly in the South African context is noticeably limited.
58
 The purpose of this study is 
to understand the financial regulations that govern these essential private equity funds and 
compare them with the UK financial regulatory framework, particularly in the time period when 
the industry has had a decline in its activity. It is envisaged that recommendations from this 
current research may help in stimulating high growth in PEIs in SA.  
  
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The significance of this study is that if the financial regulations are to effectively regulate the 
private equity, it is imperative that there is a deeper understanding of the application and 
implication of the laws on economic activities in this sector. Empirical results from studies 
carried out on the USA time series data have also shown that VC is hugely affected by 
‘legislation and the regulation of pension funds, levels of Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and the 
provision of subsidies.’59 An appreciation of the financial regulation on PEIs and their growth 
will go a long way in influencing governmental policies in this particular area, especially, by 
highlighting particular areas impacting negatively on the growth of PEIs, which by extension 
adds to a host of other economic challenges such as the increase in the rate of unemployment. 
Although research has been performed on the impact of financial regulation on private equity 
funds in an international context, this study focuses on the financial regulation of PEIs in SA and 
                                               
56  Private Equity International Research and Analytics Quarterly Review - Q3 (2013). 
57  Portmann D & Mlambo C ‘Private equity and venture capital in South Africa: a comparison of project financing  
decisions’ (2013) 16 SAJEMS 3.  
58  Portmann D & Mlambo C ‘Private equity and venture capital in South Africa: a comparison of project financing  
decisions’ (2013) 16 SAJEMS 3.   
59  Armour J & Cumming D ‘The legislative road to Silicon valley’ (2006) 58 Oxford Economic Papers 599. 
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seeks to compare the financial regulation in SA with that of the UK as a way of determining 
ways of improving financial regulation and possibly the performance of the PEIs in SA.  
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
 
A qualitative research methodology was used for this mini-thesis.  An analytical and prescriptive 
approach was applied. Reference was made to primary sources which form the South African 
legislation that is applicable to PEIs. The mini-thesis entailed a review of secondary sources of 
information relevant to the matter namely South African and international textbooks, journal 
articles and academic writings on the topic studied as well as on related issues. Scholarly articles 
and materials from the library and the internet were also examined. A comparative analysis was 
made with an off-shore jurisdiction namely, the UK, which is generally considered an attractive 
private equity destination.
60
 In order to achieve the objectives outlined in section 1.4 above, the 
mini-thesis applied techniques of comparative research methodology that help to establish 
similarities and differences between the systems compared. In this regard, primary attention was 
devoted to comparing and analysing the laws, the policies, and the administrative measures taken 
in the implementation of financial regulation in the countries examined.  
 
1.7 LIMITATION OF SCOPE 
 
Owing to the limits on the length of an MPhil mini-thesis, this study is constrained to restrict the 
comparative analysis and discussion of the research problem to a critical examination and test of 
one jurisdiction namely the UK. The UK was used for the reason that the UK is a renowned, 
developed
61
 and attractive
62
  private equity destination. Although this critical analysis of 
financial regulations on PEIs in SA will review off-shore private equity funds and take 
cognisance of the impact of tax regulations on PEIs it will not concentrate on tax laws in South 
Africa or the international tax agreements between SA and other countries as these are outside 
the scope of this mini-thesis.  
                                               
60  Verfides ‘UK private equity funds: tax-efficient structuring’ available at   
http://www.verfides.net/images/uploads/PrivateEquity.pdf (accessed 22 April 2014).  
61  Private Equity International Research and Analytics Quarterly Review - Q3 (2013). 
62  Verfides ‘UK private equity funds: tax-efficient structuring’ available at   
http://www.verfides.net/images/uploads/PrivateEquity.pdf (accessed 22 April 2014). 
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1.8 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS  
 
This mini-thesis is organised into six chapters as outlined below:  
 Chapter two gives the general overview of private equity legal structures namely the 
en commandite partnerships and bewind trusts.  
 
Chapter three provides a broad outline of financial regulation of private equity funds under 
the South African law. In the chapter the different pieces of legislation and regulations that 
affect private equity transactions are discussed. 
 
Chapter four provides a critical analysis of SA’s financial regulations in comparison with 
another competitive jurisdiction namely, the UK. The main reason is to establish the United 
Kingdom’s legal and regulatory framework on private equity and its effectiveness compared with 
SA. Given the historical relationship between the UK and SA, a number of similarities in the 
legal systems regulating private equity exist and are also discussed.  
Chapter five discusses the implications of financial regulation on private equity investments in 
SA.  The discussion provides a basis for recommendations suggested in Chapter six. 
 
Chapter six concludes the mini-thesis and suggests recommendations for improving financial 
regulation of private equity funds in SA.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA  
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In economic terms private equity is defined as capital that is temporarily invested in new or 
growing firms that are not listed on the public stock exchange in return for part ownership and a 
share of the profits of the firms.
63
 Private equity investors usually buy a stake in a private or 
public company for a few years. They aim to ultimately increase the value of the stake by 
improving the financial and operating results of the company and then exiting by selling back 
their shares to the business while making a profit on the investment.
64
  
The major investment structures of private equity funds in SA are en commandite partnerships 
and bewind trusts. Alternatively, where the ‘appropriate regulatory requirements permit, a 
collective investment scheme structure can sometimes be used to house private equity funds.’65 
PEIs may sometimes take the legal structure of a company. In SA, the corporate legal structure is 
not really preferred by investors as companies are viewed ‘as not being tax transparent and can 
potentially increase the tax burden for investors.’66 In addition, corporations pay taxes separately 
and apart from the owners which can potentially lead to double taxation: first, on profits made by 
the company and secondly on the dividends given to the shareholders. The en commandite 
partnership and bewind trust legal structures ensure that the liability for taxes is not on the fund 
itself but on the individual investors in the private equity fund.
67
 These PEIs legal structures are 
                                               
63 KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries- 
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014). 
64 Marples D.J Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers (2014) 3. 
65 Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com 
(accessed 19 November 2014). 
66 Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview' available  
at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
67 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
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generally not subject to burdensome regulatory oversight and legislation plays a limited role in 
their regulation. Therefore, in sum, the legal structures common with PEIs in SA are the en 
commandite partnerships and bewind trusts.  
It has been proposed that to some extent the legal structure of private equity funds influences the 
way they are regulated. Therefore, this chapter reviews the structure of PEIs in SA; specifically 
the major private equity legal structures, namely, the en commandite partnerships and bewind 
trusts, and the implications of these structures in the regulation of private equity funds.  
2.2 PRIVATE EQUITY LEGAL STRUCTURES IN SA 
2.2.1 En commandite partnerships 
A partnership is a ‘legal agreement between two or more persons, who undertake to contribute to 
a lawful enterprise which is carried on with the object of making a profit and sharing it between 
the partners.’68 In SA, a partnership is not a legal person distinct from the partners that set it up.69 
A partnership in SA has no separate legal identity or existence and in general, it has no limited 
liability. South African partnership law is common law based. There are several important legal 
implications that arise because the partnership does not have a separate legal persona distinct 
from the members who form it. The legal nature of a partnership in SA is such that the ‘rights 
and liabilities of the partnership are the rights and liabilities of the partners, and are enforceable 
by and against them individually.’70  
Partnerships in SA can be broadly classified as general (ordinary) partnerships or extraordinary 
partnerships, depending on the liability of the partners and the extent of the profit-sharing. 
Extraordinary partnerships are either anonymous (sleeping) partnerships or en commandite 
(limited) partnerships. PEIs often take the legal structure of en commandite partnerships. An en 
commandite partnership is a form of a partnership in which there are one or more silent partners 
who contribute funds and are only liable for the capital invested.
71
 It has two categories of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
68 Cassim FHI et al The Law Of Business Structure (2012) 13.  
69  Cassim FHI et al The Law Of Business Structure (2012) 18. 
70  Strydom v Protea Eiendomsagente 1979 (2) SA 206 (T). 
71 Dudley Lee ‘En commandite partnerships’ available at http://www.ghostdigest.co.za/articles/en-commandite-     
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partners, namely, the disclosed or general partner (GP) and the undisclosed or limited partner
72
 
(LP) (Fig. 1). The GPs, also referred to as the managing partners in the en commandite 
partnership, are the private equity firms, while the LPs are external investors. In return for their 
expertise and for managing the PEIs, the GPs charge advisory or management fees. The charge 
made by GPs that is linked to the performance of the PEIs is known as carried interest.
73
 All the 
partners in private equity funds are bound by the requirement to carry on the PEIs’ activities to 
the greatest common advantage. 
South African law allows a natural person, a company and another partnership to invest in an en 
commandite partnership. Previously, the Companies Act
74
 limited a private entity which had a 
goal of making profit to a maximum of 20 members, otherwise it would then be incorporated 
into a public or private company; but the new Act
75
 does not have this prohibition. The statutory 
limit on the number of partners in registered partnerships formed in SA was abolished in 2010.
76
 
Generally, private equity funds are constituted by 10 to 30 LPs, who are mostly institutional 
investors.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
partnerships/54506 (accessed 16 January 2015). 
72  Section 24H of the Income Tax Act. 
73 Marples DJ Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers (2014) 3. 
74 Section 30 Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
75 Act 71 of 2008. 
76 Cassim FHI The Practitioner’s Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) 5.  
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Figure 1: The legal structure of the en commandite partnership  
Adapted from SAVCA (2010:6)
77
  
The en commandite partnership provides LPs, who are also called commanditarian partners or 
the partners whose names are not disclosed, with limited liability. Examples of LPs are insurance 
companies, banks, foundations, endowments, collective investment schemes, government 
agencies, private equity funds, development funding instuitions and individual investors with 
significant resources. By participating in an en commandite partnership a LP is afforded special 
common law protection from creditors in case of insolvency and owes the partnership only to the 
extent of the amount contributed.
78
 The LPs cannot actively participate in the  management of 
the private equity fund established as an en commandite partnership and may lose their common 
law limited liability protection if they do so. The LPs are only financial participants who invest a 
fixed amount of money, receive a certain share of the profits and have restricted liability similar 
                                               
77   Submission to National Treasury: An Industry Response to Regulation 28 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 16 April  
2010. 
78 Mmabatho Food Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Fourie 1985 (1) SA 318 (T). 
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to that of members of a close corporation or shareholders of a company.
79
 However, there are 
slight differences between the LPs in an en commandite partnership and the shareholders of a 
company. The differences include that shareholders have proprietary rights to any property left 
after winding up, and proprietary rights to transfer their shares as they can cede their shares to a 
third party if they no longer want to be a part of a company. Transfer of an interest in an en 
commandite partnership can only be made ‘with the authorisation of a GP but only after strict 
due diligence, and in some funds only after a minimum initial investment period’.80 
The GPs on the other hand have unlimited liability in an en commandite partnership and 
generally invest 1% of the total funds.
81
 The GPs have the full decision making authority, full 
financial liability and can be sued for the full amount of the suit. This means that if the 
partnership is declared insolvent by a court, the GP and not the en commandite partners will be 
sequestrated.  However, the ‘current market practice in SA tends to exempt the GP from liability 
for all but gross negligence, criminal conduct and material breach of the partnership 
agreement’.82 Therefore, market practice tends to ‘indemnify the GP against all losses that are 
not caused by gross negligence or criminal conduct’.83 
The en commandite partnerships are cheap to form and can be established with relative ease as 
they are established by contract
84
 and, unlike a company; do not have to be incorporated through 
a Memorandum of Incorporation. A partnership agreement governs the issues of methodology 
and information requirements in an en commandite partnership. The contract between the LP and 
the GP expressly reflects the intention
85
 of establishing an en commandite partnership and 
expressly identifies the general or disclosed partners. In addition, individual, institutional 
investors, such as pension funds, may negotiate side letter terms. The side-letter terms set out the 
                                               
79 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
80 Joint Money Laundering Steering Group ‘Private equity’ available at http://www.jmlsg.org.uk/download/8179  
(accessed 28 December 2014).  
81 Khoza F ‘Retirement funds in private equity funds: some issues to consider’ available at  
http://www.bowman.co.za/News- Blog/Blog/retirement-funds-investment-private-equity-funds (accessed 28 December 
2014). 
82 Khoza F ‘Retirement funds in private equity funds: some issues to consider’ available at  
http://www.bowman.co.za/News-Blog/Blog/retirement-funds-investment-private-equity-funds (accessed 28 December 
2014). 
83 Khoza F ‘Retirement funds in private equity funds: some issues to consider’ available at  
http://www.bowman.co.za/News-Blog/Blog/retirement-funds-investment-private-equity-funds (accessed 28 December 
2014). 
84 A contract is a binding agreement or promise to do something. 
85 Purdon v Muller 1961 (2) SA 211 (A). 
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‘conditions and set self-imposed restrictions between the GP and the LP in order to protect the 
investor’s interests.’86 Examples of some terms that LPs may include as investment restrictions 
may include the following:  
‘restrictions on geographic and sector exposure and on borrowing and hedging, key 
persons’ time commitment, the appointment of an investors’ advisory board, which 
usually regulates conflicts of interest that have been paid in excess of the GP’s 
entitlement and reserved matters that require limited partner approval’87 
The covenants or restrictions in a side letter allow GPs and LPs to align their objectives and 
reduce agency costs. The side letter further clarifies the potential management objectives of the 
private equity fund and those of portfolio companies.  
As stated above, the en commandite partnership is not a juristic person or a corporate entity and 
cannot have an estate. The estates of the partners and the en commandite partnership are mostly 
regarded as separate.
88
 Therefore the assets of the partnership are held by the GPs and LPs ‘as 
co-right holders and this common stock may be called the partnership estate.’89 ‘Co-owners of 
partnership property hold such property in undivided shares and the property may only be’ used 
for partnership purposes.
90
 In an en commandite partnership the partners own the assets in 
proportion to their contributions. On the other hand, a company is a legal person that exists,
91
 
and the shareholders do not own what the company owns. A company has the power to enter into 
a contract
92
 in its own name, can sue and be sued. Similarly, a partnership may sue and be sued 
in its name as it is considered a separate entity on matters of civil procedure.
93
 The concept that 
partnerships have no legal persona is not followed through particularly on matters of insolvency, 
litigation, value-added tax and some common law exceptions.  
                                               
86  Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview' available  
at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
87 Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview' available  
at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
88 Section 13 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
89 Stephan van der Merwe Attorneys ‘The law of partnership -principles of the South African law of  
partnership’ available at https://sites.google.com/site/stephanvdmerwe/thelawofpartnership (accessed 5 February 2014). 
90 Stephan van der Merwe Attorneys ‘The law of partnership - principles of the South African law of  
partnership’ available at  https://sites.google.com/site/stephanvdmerwe/thelawofpartnership (accessed 5 February 
2014). 
91 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 190 AD 530. 
92 Section 33 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
93  High Court Rule 14 (5) (h). 
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The en commandite partnership is usually terminated as agreed by all the partners in the 
partnership agreements, which may, for example, provide that the GP may end the partnership 
after notifying the other partners.
94
 In SA, a private equity fund is generally operated for 10 to 12 
years and then it is wound up.
95
 This is in contrast to a company that has a perpetual existence.
96
 
The South African legislation provides ways of liquidating or dissolving a company. On the 
other hand, in an en commandite partnership, ‘when there is death, resignation, retirement, 
insolvency of partner and when a new partner enters the partnership, the old partnership is 
dissolved.’97 In such an instance, on a technical basis, each of the partners disposes of a portion 
of the underlying investments to the new partners, which may cause potential tax implications on 
unrealised gains for the other partners. 
PEIs structured as en commandite partnerships cannot be bound outside the terms of the 
partnership agreement. While the provisions of the partnership agreement bind the GP and LP, 
they are not necessarily binding on the creditors of the partnership.
98
 En commandite 
partnerships are governed by the South African common law and by specific sections of the 
Insolvency Act. The common law rules laid by the courts on partnerships are default principles 
that only apply when the partnership agreement does not modify them or is silent on the issue.
99
 
The common law in SA is based on the Roman and Roman-Dutch law and consequently the 
Roman-Dutch law governs en commandite partnerships. The Roman Dutch law in SA is found in 
the writings of a number of jurists that include Johannes Voet and Hugo de Groot. These 
writings are considered authoritative by the South African courts. The ‘treatise on the law of 
partnerships by the French jurist Pothier, together with English cases that have heavily 
influenced the South African law’ of partnerships also apply in the regulation of en commandite 
partnerships.
100
 The regulatory framework of en commandite partnerships under South African 
and English law has a number of similarities; however, there are also some essential distinctions 
                                               
94 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
95 Marples DJ Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers (2014) 3. 
96 Section 20 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
97  Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
 http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
98  Cassim FHI The Practitioner’s Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) 25. 
99  Cassim FHI The Practitioner’s Guide to the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (2011) 25. 
100 Stephan van der Merwe Attorneys‘The law of partnership -principles of the South African law of partnership’ available  
at https://sites.google.com/site/stephanvdmerwe/thelawofpartnership (accessed 5 February 2014). 
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between the two, some of which will be discussed in Chapter 4. In such cases the English law 
only serves as a guide.
101
 
 
2.2.2 Bewind trusts 
The second investment structure in which PEIs in SA are typically structured is the bewind trust. 
A bewind trust is a legal structure in which the ‘founder of the trust transfers assets or property to 
an intermediate person known as a trustee and gives them the right to hold and manage the assets 
or property for the benefit of beneficiaries.’102 The main difference between a bewind trust and 
an ordinary trust and is that the ownership of the applicable property in the former is conferred 
on the beneficiaries of the trust and not the trustees.
103
 In other types of trusts, the property of the 
trust is owned by the trustees on behalf of beneficiaries. The trustees hold the assets in line with 
the provisions of the trust deed and separate from their own estates.
104
 In a bewind trust the 
beneficiaries own the assets but the control and management of the assets vests in the trustees.  
The term ‘bewind’ originated from the Dutch law (bewind) and the Roman-Dutch law 
(bewindhebber) concept of administration. Although the Roman and Roman-Dutch law forms 
the foundation of South African common law, the concept of trusts in the South African 
jurisprudence originated mostly from Germanic and English law.
105
 In sum, the laws that now 
regulate and govern a bewind trust in SA are the common law, the Trust Property Control Act 
and the trust deed.
106
 The Trust Property Control Act
107
 mainly oversees specific administrative 
issues concerning trusts.
108
 
Although there are a number of statutes in SA that define a trust as a legal person generally a 
bewind trust is not a legal person unless such a definition applies. An example, is the Income Tax 
                                               
101 Stephan van der Merwe Attorneys‘The law of partnership -principles of the South African law of partnership’ available  
at https://sites.google.com/site/stephanvdmerwe/thelawofpartnership (accessed 5 February 2014). 
102 Smith BS The Authorization of Trustees in the  South African Law of Trusts And Responsibilities 
(unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Free State Bloemfontein, 2006) 7. 
103 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
104  Geach W & Yeats J Trusts (2007) 171. 
105 Smith BS The Authorization of Trustees in the  South African Law of Trusts And Responsibilities 
(unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Free State Bloemfontein, 2006) 9. 
106 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988.  
107 Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988.  
108  Geach W & Yeats J Trusts (2007) 171. 
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Act,
109
 which defines a trust as a ‘legal person’ that can ‘incur tax liability for the income that it 
earns during a year of assessment or on any capital gains on the disposal of capital assets.’110 The 
other statutes, such as, the Close Corporations Act,
111
 The Companies Act,
112
 The Transfer Duty 
Act,
113
 The National Credit Act,
114
 and the Financial Intelligence Act
115
 (FICA) also define a 
trust as a legal person. 
When private equity vehicles are structured as bewind trusts, the initial assets of the trust are the 
amounts contributed by the institutional investors. The trustees of the bewind trust then appoint 
fund managers to make investments. The trustees in the PEIs do not own the undivided shares; 
the shares are owned by the investors of the trust.
116
 Therefore the institutional investors are the 
beneficiaries of the bewind trust, who ‘own the jointly undivided shares in proportion to their 
respective contributions.’117  
The bewind trusts are established by way of a document that is called a trust deed.
118
 The 
document gives physical confirmation of ownership in a piece of real property. The rights of the 
beneficiaries are derived from the trust deed and as a result they can enforce the founder’s 
objectives.
119
 The major requirement in the formation of bewind trusts is that the beneficiaries 
have to be clearly identified and there needs to be at least one beneficiary for the trust to be valid. 
The bewind trust deed sets out the rights, duties, obligations, parties and the constitution of the 
trust and the Trust Property Control Act
120
 provides for the the significance of the duties. The 
Act only regulates certain administrative aspects that relate to bewind trusts.
121
 In comparison to 
the Companies Act or the Close Corporations Act, The Trust Property Control Act does not 
                                               
109 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
110 Section 1 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
111 Act 69 of 1984. 
112 Act 71 of 2008. 
113 Act 40 of 1949. 
114 Act 34 of 2005. 
115 Act 38 of 2001. 
116 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
 http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
117 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
 http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
118 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
119 RAS and Others NNO v Van der Meulen and Another 2011 (4) SA 17 (SCA). 
120 Act 57 of 1988. 
121  Geach W & Yeats J Trusts (2007) 4. 
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regulate the establishment of a trust as strictly as the aforementioned Acts do with their 
respective entities.  
Unlike a company that comes into existence through incorporation, bewind trusts are formed 
through a registration process that is approved by the Master of the High Court.
122
 When setting 
up a bewind trust in SA ‘the assets and property need to be defined with certainty and the object 
has to be made sufficiently certain.’123 The Master has extensive regulatory powers in relation to 
the trust and may, for example, in certain instances remove the trustees or apply to court for their 
removal.
124
 The trustees that are appointed to manage a bewind trust are required to be capable of 
carrying out their duties. When a trustee fails to execute any responsibilities that are enforced by 
a ‘trust instrument, the Master of the High Court’ or anyone with an interest in the trust assets 
can apply for an order that instructs the trustee to carry out such duties.
125
 
A trust is usually seen as a trading option that provides trustees with limited liability against the 
bewind trust's debts. Trusts provide investors with continuity and any assets they own remain 
unaffected by the death of trustees.
 126
 However, although the major reason of setting up a trust is 
for certainty and continuity, a trust deed can be amended, which leads to a deviation from the 
intentions of the founder and a change in the expectations of the beneficiaries.
127
 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
 
En commandite partnerships and bewind trusts constitute the main legal structures of PEIs in SA. 
Unlike in a company where regulation is set by the Companies Act, the governance of an en 
commandite partnership is set out in the partnership agreement and when PEIs are regulated by a 
partnership agreement between parties, the uncodified common law of contract plays a 
particularly significant role. The Roman and Roman-Dutch law laid down the basis of the South 
African common law and therefore applies in the regulation of PEIs. The major advantage of en 
                                               
122 Section 6 (1) Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. 
123 Geach W ‘Some topical issues relating to trusts’ available at  
http://www.mcatv.co.za/files/Download/Trusts_Walter_Geach.pdf (accessed 20 December 2014). 
124 Section 20 (1) Trust Property Control Act 57. 
125 Section 19 Trust Property Control Act 57. 
126 Geach W ‘Some topical issues relating to trusts’ available at  
http://www.mcatv.co.za/files/Download/Trusts_Walter_Geach.pdf (accessed 20 December 2014). 
127 Geach W ‘Some topical issues relating to trusts’ available at  
http://www.mcatv.co.za/files/Download/Trusts_Walter_Geach.pdf (accessed 20 December 2014). 
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commandite partnerships and bewind trusts is that they have a tax transparent status that allows 
investors to be taxed individually and according to the tax profile of each investor.
128
 The en 
commandite partnerships are governed by the common law that allows GPs to exercise extensive 
control over the activities of the private equity funds with few legal obligations. The other 
advantage of the en commandite partnership is that a LP does not incur debts from the 
partnership in an amount bigger than their capital contribution. The LP maintains the limited 
liability status by observing the common law requirements. This limitation of the partnership’s 
losses means that the individual assets of the partners are safe from being seized by third parties 
should the en commandite partnership be liquidated. An en commandite partnership, also permits 
LPs to ring-fence risk whilst the GPs, manage investments on their behalf and assume the 
general unlimited liability.
129
 Traditionally, the contractual flexibility of en commandite 
partnerships permits LPs to have restricted direct control on the activities of fund managers and 
as a result, have specific monitoring rights over how the legal structure is adminstered.
130
 They 
can also establish advisory boards made up of LPs. In addition, the en commandite partnerships 
agreements and side letters permit GPs and LPs to enter into contracts that align their goals and 
lessen opportunism or agency costs. However, as the GPs typically have more inside information 
it is usually to their benefit to highlight their achievements and tone down potential 
challenges.
131
 
 
One of the major concerns on en commandite partnerships is the failure of the law to recognise 
the partnership as a separate legal entity and this is seen as possibly its most notable defect.
132
 
CGT is often also raised as a disadvantage of en commandite partnerships. In PEIs, the GPs 
typically form a different partnership each time the investment phase for the old partnership has 
been accomplished. At this point the old LPs are considered to have disposed of their interest in 
the partnership assets and when there is the disposal of shares, tax is often raised.  The 
‘realisation gains are usually treated as being of a capital nature even where the shares were not 
                                               
128 Marples DJ Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers (2014) 3. 
129 Verfides ‘UK private equity funds: tax-efficient structuring’ available at  
http://www.verfides.net/images/uploads/PrivateEquity.pdf (accessed 3 January2015). 
130  Sahu R, Nath A & Banerjee P ‘Trends in private equity and venture capital investments with  
special focus on the booming India growth story’ (2009) 4 Journal of International Commercial Law and  
Technology 2.  
131  Prowse SD The Economics of the Private Equity Market (1998). 
132  Cassim FHI et al The Law of Business Structure (2012) 18.  
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held for the required three years before the date of disposal.’133 Another concern of PEIs 
structured as en commandite partnerships involves the significant use of debt in relation to the 
obscure ownership of economic risks.
134
  
 
In comparison with a juristic person or company, a bewind trust is flexible due to its relative lack 
of statutory formality in its formation and operation.
135
 The flexibility of trusts has, however, 
been cited as the reason they have been abused in the past and as a result are increasingly coming 
under scrutiny by the courts.
136
 Generally the en commandite partnership is becoming more 
popular than the bewind trust because they are operated in accordance with international trends 
and governance methods. In addition, the Exchange Control regulation of 1961, gives a special 
concession to funds that wish to invest in Africa when they are structured as en commandite 
partnerships, largely because the legal structure of a bewind trust is less favoured by the South 
African National Treasury.
137
 
 
In essence, it is normally of importance that each and every institutional investor carefully 
considers the private equity fund legal structure before committing to PEIs as it impacts on the 
tax, liability and risk of the investment. In investment decisions involving pension funds, for 
instance, it would be imperative to consider the implications of the legal structure of PEIs in 
relation to the lifetime savings, pensioners’potential liability and the liquidity risk. Although 
private equity funds are implicitly governed by the common law, there are various and distinct 
sections of legislation that also regulate the financial activities of PEIs. The next chapter 
discusses the statutes that are relevant in the financial regulation of PEIs in SA. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
133  Mendes A ‘Private equity fund structures in South Africa: are there real tax benefits in one structure over the  
other?’ (2009) available at https://www.ensafrica.com/newsletter/briefs/taxDec09equity.html (accessed 17 May 2015). 
134 Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
135  Geach W & Yeats J Trusts (2007) 4. 
136  Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA), Jordaan v Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C), Land and Agricultural   
Bank of South Africa v Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
137 Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa: market and regulatory overview' available  
at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial regulation is a form of supervision that involves the provision of guidance, directives 
and the imposition of constraints on financial activities.
138
 Its ultimate objective is to achieve a 
‘high degree of economic efficiency, consumer protection and ensure institutional safety and 
soundness.’139 The current state of the financial regulation of the PEI industry is the result of a 
number of historical changes in SA and in international capital markets.
140
 By and large, private 
equity financial regulation in SA ‘makes use of contractual terms or organisational practices that 
are commonly used internationally’ and is also informed by international best practice from 
institutions that include the International Organization of Securities Commission 
(IOSCO).
141
  
 
Unlike in most developed economies, in SA, there is no state agency that sets regulatory 
oversight specifically over PEIs. There is no single statute that regulates PEIs, as is the case in, 
for example, Mauritius which enacted the Mauritius Limited Liability Partnerships Act 20 of 
2011 which regulates private equity in the country. In theory, PEIs in SA could be regulated by a 
single Act, namely, the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act
142
 (CISCA), but the CISCA 
only regulates a managed pool of capital in which members of the public are allowed to 
participate. Therefore, PEIs are not regulated by CISCA as they are an administered, collective 
investment scheme that members of the public participate in as considered in the Companies Act 
                                               
138 Falkena H et al Financial Regulation in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 2. 
139 Falkena H et al Financial Regulation in South Africa 2 ed (2001) 2. 
140 KPMG & SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-                 
industries- publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014). 
141 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at 
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
142 Act 45 of 2002.  
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No. 71 of 2008.
143
 In addition, there are views that any efforts to get private equity funds to be 
regulated by the CISCA would involve complex alterations and justifications which may make 
the PEIs, as an asset class, less appealing to foreign investors.
144
 Therefore, currently, if a private 
equity fund were to follow the legislative requirements of the CISCA, it would result in the fund 
being illegitimate and the private equity fund managers being criminally liable.
145
 
 
Although there is no single, holistic or specific legislation governing the PEIs industry in SA, 
there are various legislative and regulatory rules that regulate the financial transactions of private 
equity funds. The financial legislative framework of PEIs in SA comprises both statute and 
common law, which results in a number of different pieces of fragmented legislation and 
regulatory rules.
146
 These include the FAIS Act,
147
 B-BBEE Act
148
 and the BEE policy 
framework, the Companies Act,
149
 the PFA,
150
 the FMA,
151
  the Exchange Control Regulations 
1961 (the Regulations), Competition Act
152
 (the Competition Act), the JSE Listing Requirements 
and the King Reports on Corporate Governance. This chapter gives an overview of these 
different pieces of legislation and regulations that govern the financial activities of private equity 
funds in SA. 
3.2 The financial regulation legal framework in South Africa 
The financial legislative framework in SA is generally in the hands of the Ministry of Finance. 
The government department responsible for setting the policy framework with regards to the 
regulation of private and public sector investments, under the Minister of Finance, is the National 
Treasury. This is done through ‘two main regulators, namely, the South African Reserve Bank 
                                               
143 Regulation 28 Pension Fund Act 24 of 1956. 
144 Knight A & Buys R ‘South Africa as a gateway to Africa: foreign member funds in the spotlight’ available at 
South Africa as a gateway to Africa available at http://www.biznews.com.mailbo/za/news/2014/04/07south-Africa-as-a-
gateway-to-Africa _unpacking-new-rules-africa-focused-foreign-funds/ (accessed 8 January 2015). 
145 Act 45 of 2002. 
146 Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com 
 (accessed 19 November 2014). 
147 Act 37 of 2002. 
148 Act 53 of 2003. 
149 Act 71 of 2008. 
150 Act 24 of 1956. 
151 Act 19 of 2012. 
152  Act 89 of 1998. 
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(SARB) and the Financial Services Board (FSB).’153 The SARB ‘formulates and implements the 
monetary policy, supervises the banking sector and administers exchange controls’.154 On the 
other hand, the FSB is a ‘regulatory authority for the non-bank financial institutions approved 
financial institutions and financial services providers’.155 It regulates institutions, such as, 
‘pension funds, insurance companies, exchanges, collective investment schemes, friendly 
societies and financial services providers.’156 However, there are some categories of investment 
establishments that are not directly controlled by the FSB. Some examples of investment 
structures the FSB does not oversee are ‘exchange traded funds which are not registered as 
collective investment schemes’ and PEIs structured as partnerships and bewind trusts.157 
Therefore, in sum, the FSB does not directly regulate private equity funds in SA. One reason for 
this is that some private equity transactions are collectively regulated by the same tax and 
company laws that apply to all other entities that participate in procedures, such as, bidding or 
buyouts.
158
 In addition, PEIs normally do not issue debt or securities on financial markets and are 
therefore regarded as posing little risk to the financial sector.
159
 The other reason why PEIs are 
generally not regulated is that LPs are well-informed financial or institutional investors who 
invest through legal partnerships and contracts that safeguard investors.’160 However, in recent 
times, PEIs are considered high risk and gradually there are certain regulations that are now 
being applied globally to private equity funds with the aim of bringing all financial operations 
under regulatory scrutiny. 
3.2.1 The Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (FAIS Act) of 2002 
During the financial crisis, privately pooled funds such as PEIs received adverse publicity due to 
the uncertainty around regulations and this created a challenging fundraising environment for 
                                               
153   Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at 
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
154 Section 10 South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989. 
155 Section 3(a) Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990. 
156  Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
157 Bennet A & Loubser J ‘South Africa: The asset management review’ available at   
http://www.mondaq.com/x/209212/asset+finance/The+Asset+Management+Review+South+Africa (accessed  
11 February 2014). 
158  Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
159  Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
160  Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
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them. Policy makers, such as, the Group of 20 (G20) addressed these economic issues and 
financial threats that made the global and financial markets risky.
161
 In accordance with the 
recommendations made by the G20, the IOSCO published six principles which had to be 
followed by its Member States to reform the regulatory framework for private equity funds.
162
 
SA, being a Member of IOSCO, followed the principles by re-enforcing the already existing; 
fund manager level focused FAIS Act and added an additional layer of the Fit and Proper 
requirements, late in 2008.
163
 
 
Financial services in SA are regulated by the FAIS Act. Although there is no requirement that a 
private equity fund should be registered with a government agency, fund managers are generally 
required to register as financial services providers under the FAIS Act. Therefore, private equity 
fund managers ‘may not act or offer to act as financial services providers unless’ they are 
approved by the Registrar of Financial Services and have the required licence.
164
 The FAIS Act 
also imposes on the approved financial services providers, fiduciary duties that include the duty 
to provide ‘financial services honestly, fairly and with due care, skill and diligence.’165 
 
By requiring fund managers to register, the FAIS Act subsequently makes a provision for the 
disclosure of information on their financial operations and funds. It is mandatory for financial 
services providers to keep and submit accounting records annually that cover the operations they 
are authorised to carry out.
166
 Financial services providers that are not covered by the Companies 
Act
167
 and the Close Corporations Act,
168
 such as private equity firms, are required to include ‘at 
least a balance sheet and notes thereon; an income statement and notes thereon; a statement of 
changes in equity and notes thereon or a cash flow statement in one of the official languages of 
SA’169 The regulations issued under the FAIS Act also state that any unauthorised fund manager 
                                               
161 Head JW ‘The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 in context- reflections on international legal and institutional  
failings, fixes and fundamentals’ (2011) 23 Pac McGeorge Global Bus & Dev LJ 53. 
162 G20 G20 Working Group 1. Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency (2009). 
163 Mqokiyana N The Regulation of Hedge Fund Managers in South Africa – An Impact Assessment (unpublished  
M Comm, University of Johannesburg, 2011) 84. 
164 Section 8 FAIS Act 37 of 2002. 
165 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
 http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
166 Sections 19 (1) (a) and (b) FAIS Act 37 of 2002. 
167 Act 71 of 2008. 
168 Act 69 of 1984. 
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may not in any manner or by any means put out ‘advertisements or announcements that are 
directed at clients or make use of any name, title or designation which would imply that such a 
person’ is an approved services provider.170 
 
On 30 May 2014, the FSB made an additional requirement that inhibits the business practice of 
renting a licence. The provision ‘ensures that clients deal with the licensed fund manager even 
when it is a representative delivering the financial services.’171 Representatives who act on behalf 
of a registered adviser, including its officers, directors and control persons, are now also required 
to register in the relevant individual adviser category. In addition, there are regulatory 
examinations conducted by the FSB that individuals offering financial services are required to 
successfully complete.
172
 The authorised fund managers are also required by the FSB to comply 
with an annual fee schedule. A study carried out by Mkoyina
173
 indicated that fund managers 
viewed regulations, such as, the FAIS Act, as crucial, but that the cost associated with 
compliance was seen to be far higher than the benefits of regulation.
 
 
In comparison with listed companies, the FAIS Act places minimal financial requirements on 
fund managers of PEIs. Although, the FSB can request any information from its regulated 
entities,
174
 non-listed companies, such as, private equity funds, can select how and to what 
degree they can submit their financial records. Apart from the FAIS Act requirements, private 
equity fund managers could ‘potentially attract liability for contractual misconduct or delict due 
to fraud, non-performance or negligent misrepresentation arising from the contractual 
agreements with investors’.175 However, in SA, to date, ‘there is no well-developed body of case 
law dealing with contractual misconduct or the liability of delict’ with regards to PEIs.176 In sum, 
                                               
170 Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
 http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2014). 
171 Sections 13(1) (c) FAIS Act 37 of 2002. 
172 Section 8 (1) FAIS Act 37 of 2002. 
173 Mqokiyana N The Regulation of Hedge Fund Managers in South Africa – An Impact Assessment (unpublished  
M Comm, University of Johannesburg, 2011) 84. 
174 Financial Stability Board ‘Progress in the Implementation of G20/FSB Recommendations for South  
Africa’ (2012) available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_120619rr.pdf?page_moved=1  
(accessed 11 April 2015). 
175  Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at  
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the FAIS Act was introduced to support good and proper professional practice in the financial 
services industry in SA and this includes private equity funds. 
 
3.2.2  The Pension Funds Act (PFA) of 1956 
 
Retirement funds have traditionally preferred to invest in public companies and state securities 
rather than in the more risky unlisted PEIs.
177
 Currently, the biggest investors in the South 
African private equity market are retirement and endowment funds. ‘Of the total ZAR27.3 
billion raised by the industry in 2013, 85.2% was from pension and endowment funds,’ 5.1% 
from private equity funds and 3.3% from insurance companies.
178
 Historically, pension funds in 
SA limited investment in unlisted equity to a portion of the 5% that was also allocated for other 
alternative assets. This was mainly due to the ‘lack of proper performance data on PEIs, the lack 
of transparency of PEIs, the risk of PEIs being illiquid, and possibly the general, restricted 
familiarity with private equity as an asset class.’179 In March 2011 the Minister of Finance made 
changes to the prudential limits of the percentage to which pension funds could invest in 
different asset classes under Regulation 28 of the PFA. In accordance with the amended 
Regulation 28 of the South African PFA, ‘pension funds can now invest up to 10 per cent of their 
assets in PEIs and up to 15% of their assets in hedge funds and PEIs.’180 
 
Regulation 28 requires pension fund managers or trustees to exercise due diligence whenever 
they invest in PEIs. The pension fund managers or trustees are required to take into account risks 
(credit, market and liquidity) that are associated with making an investment in an asset class, 
such as private equity funds.
181
 In addition, trustees of pension funds are required to make 
extensive use of competent advisers in order to safeguard their own interests in any negotiation 
or contractual agreement.  
                                               
177 Mayer C ‘Institutional investment and private equity in the UK’ available at 
www.finance.ox.ac.uk/Papers/FinancialEconomics/index.htm (accessed 8 November 2015). 
178 KPMG & SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-                
industries- publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2013.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014). 
179 Missankov I, Van Dyk R & Van Biljon M et al. ‘Is private equity a suitable investment for South African pension   
funds?’ available at http://www.itinews.co.za/content/media/companydocs/5f9cc53b-ddf5-4041-8151-
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Regulation 28 defines the term ‘private equity fund’ as: 
 
‘a managed pool of capital that: 
 
• has as its main business the making of equity, equity orientated or equity related 
investments in unlisted companies to earn income and capital gains; 
 
• is not offered to the public as contemplated in the Companies Act, 2008 (Act No. 71 of 
2008); 
 
• is managed by a person licensed as a discretionary financial services provider as 
defined in the Code of Conduct for Administrative and Discretionary Financial Services 
Providers, 2003, or if a foreign private equity fund, managed by a person licensed as a 
Category 1Financial services Provider that is authorised to render financial services [in] 
securities and instruments as defined in the Determination of Fit and Proper 
Requirements for Financial Services Providers, 2008; and 
 
• is subject to conditions as may be prescribed.’182 
 
Generally, although it is mandatory for the advisers and managers of PEIs to be licensed as 
category 1 financial service providers, which is a less difficult regulatory regime, when dealing 
with pension funds, the requirement is slightly different.
183
 When pension funds are involved and 
when the PEIs’ managers who manage or advise the private equity funds are domiciled in SA, 
they are required to hold category II financial service provider licences, which have more 
onerous requirements.
184
 
 
In addition, Regulation 28 of the PFA makes provision for the Registrar of Pension Funds to 
impose additional conditions on investments made in en commandite partnerships or bewind 
trusts. The Registrar of Pension Funds published these additional requirements or conditions that 
came into effect on 31 December 2012.
185
 Therefore, pension funds in SA follow the 
requirements set out in the ‘Schedule on Conditions for Investment in Private Equity Funds’186 
                                               
182 Regulation 28 Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
183 Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview'   
(2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
184 Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S &Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview'  
(2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
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which is regulated by the FSB. Although these requirements are not mandatory, PEIs comply 
with them in order to appeal to the major investors in the country, which are pension funds.
187
 
 
The Schedule on Conditions for Investment in Private Equity Funds states that the permissible 
legal structures for private equity funds in SA include en commandite partnerships, which would 
make the pension fund a LP as discussed in Chapter 2. The second legal structure that is 
prescribed by the Registrar of Pension Funds is the bewind trust in which pension funds become 
‘co-owners in undivided shares of the trust assets and are only beneficiaries and not trustees.’188 
Pension funds may also invest in companies whose ‘assets and liabilities are limited to the assets 
and liabilities arising from their private equity investments.’189 The Registrar of Pension Funds 
also recommends ‘partnerships, open-ended investment companies or companies in which the 
assets and liabilities are limited to the assets and liabilities arising from the investments made by 
the private equity fund’ for foreign investments.190 
 
The fund managers of the PEIs that pension funds can invest in are further required to be 
members of an industry body recognised by the Registrar of Pension Funds, SAVCA.
191
 In 
addition, fund managers are required to be authorised under the FAIS Act.
192
 The pension fund 
managers also have to consider a list of prescribed due diligence matters before investing in 
PEIs. These matters include the compliance policies and procedures, the investment strategy, the 
associated risks and the carried interest or fees charged by the PEIs.
193
 The fund managers of 
PEIs are required to submit audited financial statements that comply with the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) to pension funds within a period of 120 days.
194
 The 
private equity fund’s assets are required to be audited every six months.195 Private equity funds 
                                               
187  Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S &Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview'  
(2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
188 Condition 2 (1) Section 5(2) (e) Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
189 Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com 
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190 Bowman Gilfillan ‘Conditions for investment in private equity funds’ available at  
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in SA are required to have ‘clear policies and procedures for determining the fair value of their 
assets in compliance with the International Private Equity Valuation Guidelines.’196 
 
The Registrar of Pension funds also requires PEIs to submit to retirement funds performance 
reports in periods that are not more than three months. Pension fund trustees are also required to 
consider ‘the investment and borrowing powers of the private equity fund, its sources of debt, 
redemption rights, and the ownership of the assets in the fund,’197 before investing in it. Another 
essential factor that the pension trustees also need to consider before investing in PEIs is ‘the 
liquidity profile of the private equity fund relative to the liquidity requirements and liability 
profile of the pension fund.’198 
Pension funds as the biggest percentage of investors in SA influence the regulation of PEIs 
significantly. In addition, the PFA particularly aims to protect members of the public who 
contribute collective saving funds to, and purchase pension products, from pension schemes. 
This is also evidenced by the legal structures for PEIs that the PFA recommends. The legal 
structures ensure that retirement funds have the limited liability status against the creditors’ 
claims. The Conditions for Investment in Private Equity Funds have considerably influenced the 
contractual terms and regulatory framework of PEIs that strive to be entrusted with retirement 
funds in SA
199
 and pension funds have continued to be a major source of capital for PEIs. 
3.2.3 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act of 2003  
The BEE, is defined as ‘the economic empowerment of all black people, including women, 
workers, youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas, through diverse but 
integrated socio-economic strategies’.200 Its guiding framework is the Financial Sector Charter, 
which aims to increase transformation and equitable growth in the economy.  
                                               
196 Condition 8 Regulation 28. 
197  Bowman Gilfillan ‘Conditions for investment in private equity funds’ available at  
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The PEIs industry facilitates BEE by promoting entrepreneurial initiatives and providing for the 
involvement of Blacks and other historically disadvantaged groups in the ownership and 
management of investee companies.
201
 In addition, compliance with the B-BBEE Act is 
imperative, particularly for those firms whose income comes from B-BBEE compliant 
companies, government entities and state departments. Although the B-BBEE Act and The 
Codes of Good Practice of the B-BEE Act (the Codes) do not impose legal obligations on funds, 
the B-BBEE status is an essential factor in entering into partnerships between public and private 
entities, dealing with JSE listed companies, applying for licences or concessions, tendering for 
business or buying state-owned assets.  
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry published the amendments to the Codes for private equity 
funds on 11 October 2013.
202
 They influence the private equity industry by stating the 
circumstances in which a portfolio company may regard ownership made by PEI firms as if it 
were held by Black people.
203
 The amendments are aimed at promoting Black, private equity 
fund management and therefore target mainly PEIs fund managers as well as the funds 
themselves. The amendments also provide incentive for investee companies to benefit from 
funds from PEIs with Black fund managers in order for them to get a better B-BBEE rating.
204
 
The private equity fund manager is required to invest a proportion of the total amount of its 
‘funds under management in companies that have at least a 25% black shareholding.’205 The 
Codes allow investee companies to consider equity ‘held by PEIs as being held by Black persons 
if, among other things,’206 
 ‘at least 51% of any of the votes held by that fund's private equity fund manager in the 
underlying portfolio company are held by black persons. 
 
                                               
201 KPMG & SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the 
2012 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries- 
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 at least 51% of the private equity funds executive management and senior management is 
made up of black persons; 
 
 at least 51% of the profits made by the Private Equity Fund Manager after realizing any 
investment made by it must by written agreement accrue to black persons; and 
 
 the fund manager is a company owned by black Persons.’ 
 
The amended generic Codes of Good Practice
207
 that came into effect on the 1 May 2015 provide 
a new standard framework for determining compliance to the B-BBEE Act across all sectors of 
the economy and illustrate how the different amounts of the scorecard are to be measured in 
companies. Previously, it was not clear how an entity’s B-BBEE status would be evaluated, but 
the recently published amendments to the Codes provide that the sector-specific B-BBEE status 
of a company remain the measuring yardstick for B-BBEE and should be measured according to 
a rating scale for the relevant sector.
208
 Therefore the above discussed Sector Codes of the 
private equity funds as published in 2013 are still maintained for the industry. However, with 
regards to PEIs regulation, it is also important to fully understand how ratings of portfolio 
companies will be affected by the new generic Codes. In order for an entity to maintain a specific 
B-BBEE status it now needs to reassess its B-BBEE strategy as the points required to attain 
previous B-BBEE levels have been increased. This is especially imperative for portfolio 
companies which are expected to have a certain minimum B-BBEE status by their clients or 
where contractual obligations require them to maintain a minimum B-BBEE status.
209
 In 
addition, companies may need to attain a certain B-BBEE rating before they can be issued a 
permit, licence, or other authorisation.
210
 Other notable changes include that the overall amount 
of points that can be scored has gone up from 107 to 118, treatment of a company that is 51%-or-
                                               
207  Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Generic Codes of Good Practice Amended Codes of  
Good Practice, gazette No. 36928. 
208  Werksmans Attorneys ‘Amendments to the BBBEE Act and the Codes explained’ (2014) available at  
http://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/041763-WERKSMANS-bbbee-booklet.pdf (accessed 17  
May 2015). 
209  Cunard D ‘Code amendment gives BEE impetus to private equity funds’ available at    
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more black-owned as if it were 100% black owned, and discouraging fronting practices.
211
 In 
addition, a limit is now placed on the points scored under the management control and skills 
development to economic active population targets for African, Indian and Coloureds and it is 
now  more difficult for large companies to achieve targets on management control and skills 
development.
212
  
 
While the new amendments still encourage new black entrants to the fund management industry, 
the treatment of BEE in private equity has been slightly different from that of other entities. This 
different treatment of PEIs has always raised concerns of new types of fronting practices. These 
practices are formal arrangements that appear to be B-BBEE compliant when in fact are non-
compliant when scrutinised closely. The PEIs industry awaits to see if the new Codes published, 
which came into effect in May 2015, will completely eliminate the problem of fronting practices. 
All sectors of the South African economy are now required to comply with B-BBEE legislation 
hence B-BBEE transactions are now widespread.  The BEE framework and B-BBEE 
transactions have therefore also had a huge impact in private equity transactions, particularly in 
the regulation of fund managers and, to a lesser extent, the funds themselves. 
 
3.2.4 Companies Act 71 of 2008  
 
The Companies Act has an indirect effect on en commandite partnerships and bewind trusts. It 
regulates transactions, such as IPOs, and the takeover regime as well as fund managers who are 
incorporated in SA. It is also relevant to the management of portfolio companies and to PEIs that 
are in a corporate legal structure. The Companies Act addresses issues, such as, ‘the 
incorporation, registration, organisation and management of the portfolio companies, impartial 
and well-organised amalgamations, company takeovers and mergers.’213 In general, private 
                                               
211  Werksmans Attorneys ‘Amendments to the BBBEE Act and the Codes explained’ (2014) available at  
http://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/041763-WERKSMANS-bbbee-booklet.pdf (accessed 17  
May 2015). 
212  Werksmans Attorneys ‘Amendments to the BBBEE Act and the Codes explained’ (2014) available at  
http://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/041763-WERKSMANS-bbbee-booklet.pdf (accessed 17 May 
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213 Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com 
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equity funds do not own all of the shares they acquire in companies, but own a stake that is big 
enough for them to decide who sits on the investee company’s board of directors.214 
 
When PEIs are made in listed companies with the intention of making them private, that is, a 
buyout, a transaction such as this is mainly governed by the Companies Act. The common law 
fiduciary duties that a private equity fund which sits on the board of directors is subject to, 
include the ‘duty to exercise independent judgment, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest and the 
duty to act in the shareholders’ best interests.’215 These fiduciary duties, which were formerly 
regulated by the common law and seek to ensure ‘transparency, higher levels of corporate 
governance and accountability’ in South African companies, have been partially codified in the 
Companies Act.
216
 The ccommon law duty of care and skill in business judgements have been in 
partially codified in the Companies Act. According to the Act, when a director makes a decision 
in good faith, with care and on an informed basis, thinking that it is in the best interest of the 
company, they cannot incur liability in respect of the decision.
217
 
 
Directors, in the amended Companies Act, now have an additional duty to disclose financial 
interests that arise personally or through a related person. 
218
 When a director either personally or 
through a related person has an interest in a financial matter being discussed in a board meeting, 
the transaction is required to be disclosed in writing before the matter is considered.
219
 This 
provision in the Companies Act stresses the importance of transparency and accountability. 
When private equity firms sit on the board of directors of investee companies they risk breaching 
the prescribed directors’ duties if they behave in a way meant to help their shareholding without 
upholding the stakeholder model. In addition, while there used to be less difficult accounting 
requirements for private companies, the Companies Act now requires all accounting statements 
to be prepared according to the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) accounting standards.
220
  
                                               
214 Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’(2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
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When a private equity fund makes an offer to make a public takeover of a company, the process 
is highly regulated by the JSE Listing Requirements and the Takeover Regulations of the 
Companies Act. Therefore, private equity funds in their financial transactions with a target 
company listed on the JSE are required by the South African law to observe the general 
disclosure requirements.
221
 The private equity fund transactions are required to comply with ‘the 
form and conduct of offers, the announcements, asset valuations, mandatory offers, equal 
treatment of shareholders and the disclosure of information.’222 
 
The Companies Act provides that shareholders in a takeover should be notified and must approve 
of the takeover of a bigger part or all of a target portfolio company’s assets. It also provides for 
the ‘compulsory acquisition of minority shareholdings when an offeror acquires 90 per cent of 
total equity in the target investee company.’223 However, the business rescue arrangement that is 
in accordance with Chapter 6 of the Companies Act provides for another circumstance which 
does not require a special resolution.
224
 The Takeover Regime in the Companies Act imposes a 
number of restrictions on transactions involving public companies and those entities identified as 
regulated companies. The Companies Act’s Takeover Regulations225 set the formalities that are 
required to be followed when PEIs are involved in an affected transaction under the takeover 
regime. In relation with a private equity fund, an affected transaction would include, ‘an offer to 
purchase shares, the purchase of a company as a going concern or a scheme of arrangement.’226 
The disclosure requirements for a takeover offer and a members’ scheme of arrangement include 
the disclosure of the details of the private equity funds’ or  ‘bidder’s intentions and prospectus, 
the funding arrangements for cash consideration’ and all details that a bidder has and that may be  
essential for the shareholders to make a decision.
227
An example is when the private equity firm 
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221 Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com 
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making the IPO is already an insider of the target company or makes the bid acting jointly with 
insiders, such as with senior management of the target company. The bidder is prohibited from 
procuring shares until the inside information is made public or stops being material.  
 
Private equity funds normally can take over a public company when the company is either 
profoundly under-valued by the market or when the companies business strategy is inconsistent 
with the JSE requirements. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the Companies Act and 
the associated regulatory provisions, such as the JSE Listing Requirements, have considerable 
influence on the functioning of private equity transactions, such as, takeovers and IPOs. The 
challenge now would be harmonising it with other regulatory instruments so that a consolidated 
framework for regulating PEIs is developed. 
 
3.2.5 Competition Act 89 of 1998 
 
The regulation of PEIs in SA is influenced by the Competition Act. PEIs are subject to the 
Competition Act particularly when there is merging of portfolio companies. When a private 
equity fund is involved in a merger as defined by the Competition Act it is required to inform the 
competition authorities of the specific transaction. A transaction of this nature is subject to the 
Competition Act when it involves portfolio companies that meet the ‘asset and turnover 
thresholds established in terms of the Act.’228 The transaction is also required to have an effect 
within SA. If a private equity fund is involved in a foreign merger, the provisions of the Act 
apply only to the ‘extent that the foreign investors have assets in SA or to the extent that their 
turnover or sales are generated in, into or from SA.’ 229  
 
The Competition Act provides for a number of exploitations that may be carried out by big 
companies which have a ‘market share of 35% or more’ and prohibits anti-competitive 
conduct’..230 Some forms of market abuse that the Act prohibits include predatory pricing, 
                                                                                                                                                       
content/uploads/2012/04/Getting-the-deal-through-Transactions-2012.pdf (accessed 10 January 2015). 
228  Section 12 Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
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collusive tendering and price fixing.’231 The Department of Economic Development in SA 
monitors the enforcement framework of the Competition Tribunal and Competition Commission. 
The authorities in reaching their verdicts can take into account both economic competitiveness 
and the broad community concerns that include the B-BBEE. Consequently, the Competition Act 
helps to bring fair competition within the private equity industry in SA. 
 
3.2.6  The Financial Markets Act 19 (FMA) of 2012 and JSE Listing Requirements  
 
When a private equity firm needs to carry out an IPO there is a high level of corporate 
governance and disclosure with regards to the board of directors. In order to meet the listing 
requirements, when offering shares to potential shareholders, PEI firms cannot give misleading 
details or omit mandatory information as this attracts statutory liability with considerable fines. 
The statutory liability includes all parties involved in the ‘listing or the preparation of the 
prospectus, including deemed personal liability of current or proposed directors.’232 Since 2013, 
market abuses, such as, ‘insider trading, manipulative, improper, false or deceptive trading, and 
the making of false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises and forecasts,’ are now 
regulated by the FMA.
233
 The regulatory framework of the JSE Listing Requirements and the 
FMA seek to protect consumers from making bad decisions by ensuring that everyone gets all 
relevant information on the stock exchange. Information is regarded as public when it is 
disseminated on the appropriate channel, which is the JSE’s Stock Exchange News Service 
(SENS), for all registered brokers to access it. Once inside information is eliminated, insider 
trading is also eliminated.
234
 
 
The JSE set the Additional Listings Requirements to deter the use of inside information in the   
dealings carried out by company directors. A director is not permitted to deal in shares that relate 
to an issuer before obtaining approval from the Chairman of the Board or an appointed director. 
Directors are also required to seek approval when they wish to deal during a ‘prohibited period.’ 
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A prohibited period is a time period when there is ‘unpublished price sensitive information in 
relation to the issued securities, whether or not the director has knowledge of it.’235 According to 
the JSE Listings Requirements when a portfolio company plans to undertake transactions that 
may impact the price of a target or acquiring company’s shares, the portfolio company is 
required to make public declarations of such information. To avoid insider trading whenever 
considered necessary, all firms participating on the stock exchange are required to declare 
information that may influence share prices prior to its publication on SENS.
236
 In addition, 
although sustainability is not a feature of the Companies Act, the JSE Listing Requirements and 
the King III Report require companies to ensure sustainability is incorporated in their decision 
making and to account for their own sustainability.
237
 
 
The FMA aims to enhance the control of dealings in shares listed on the stock exchange as well 
as over-the-counter transactions.
238
 It is clear that its intention is to promote investor confidence 
and transparency; however, data vendors such as I-Net Bridge and McGregor BFA fear it could 
increase risk for market participants.
239
 The FMA’s legislative and regulatory frameworks  
complies with the recommendations of international standard setting bodies, such as, the G20, 
the IOSCO, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
240
  
According to financial analysts, the JSE remains appealing under the FMA governance and 
foreign investors and issuers find it akin to international financial markets in other G20 
jurisdictions.
241
 There is more effective regulation of the stock exchange under the regulation of 
FMA and the JSE Listing Requirements but the major challenge may be compliance and 
enforcement thereof. It remains to be seen how South African courts will decide on complex 
matters raised in the FMA.  
                                               
235  JSE Insider Trading Booklet (2013)12. 
236 Section 78(4) of the FMA.  
237 Loots & Shah Sustainable capitalism, corporate reporting and the role of the accounting profession in SA  
Corporate Report (2013) 6. 
238 Act 36 of 2004. 
239  FSP Invest ‘SA's new Financial Markets Act gets data vendors hot under the collar’ available at  
http://fspinvest.co.za/articles/latest-news/sas-new-financial-markets-act-gets-data-vendors-hot-under-the-collar- 
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3.2.7 The King Reports 
 
Corporate governance in portfolio companies and in PEIs structured as companies has been 
influenced by the provisions of the Companies Act and the King Reports on corporate 
governance. The Global Reporting Initiative
242
 has influenced the reporting of portfolio 
companies’ efforts particularly as regards corporate governance.243 Corporate governance 
reforms in SA that are aimed at improving the existing standards of corporate governance are 
found in the common law, the Companies Act, related legislation and the King Reports. The 
King Reports on corporate governance in SA were not specifically driven by corporate scandals 
as in the United Kingdom but by the need to be internationally competitive.
244
 
The recommendations in the King 1 Report influenced the amendment of the JSE Listing 
Requirements’ Schedule 22 which supported corporate social responsibility through the Code of 
Corporate Practices and Conduct. In addition, the King 1 Report considered the implementation 
of affirmative action and the implementation of the BEE framework by firms as good corporate 
governance practice.
245
 The King II Report introduced the concept of triple bottom line 
reporting, that is, financial, social and environment sustainability performance. Portfolio 
companies are required to report on issues, such as, ethics, health, environment and 
transformation issues, including the development of employees and black economic 
empowerment.
246
 These recommendations were in accordance with the major legislative 
initiatives, such as, ‘the Employment Equity Act,247 the Skills Development Act248 and the BEE 
Commission Report in SA.’249 
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243 Hamann R ‘Corporate social responsibility, partnerships, and institutional change: The case of mining companies  
in South Africa’ (2004) 28 National Resources Forum 285. 
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SALJ190 178. 
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The King III Report came into effect in March 2010. It is a JSE requirement for PEI transactions 
such as IPOs or delisting to be executed in accordance with the recommendations made in the 
King III Report and the Code. The King III Report recommends ‘a holistic and integrated annual 
reporting that gives sufficient details concerning the company’s triple-bottom line requirements 
and how a company upholds the principles of fairness, transparency and disclosure.’250 The 
Report further recommends that communication channels should be accessible and transparent to 
allow shareholders to make valid choices and meet JSE Social Responsibility Index 
requirements.
251
 
The King III Report is the stakeholder inclusive corporate governance approach and directors are 
required to strive to balance the ‘legitimate interests and expectations of the company’s’ various 
stakeholder groupings when making decisions.
252
 The King III Report recommends that even if 
the stakeholder interests and expectations are not considered warranted or legitimate, they should 
not be ignored.
253
 Although the King III Report is not a binding, hard law instrument, failure to 
comply with it may be an indication that the board of directors is not following the stakeholder 
model, as in the case of Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 
& Others.
254
 Although judgement given concentrated on the resignation of directors, the issue 
highlighted was to whom the directors owe their fiduciary duties when managing entities.
255
 The 
judgement is important in the sense that it gave specific recognition to environmental concerns, 
which is one of the triple-bottom line aspects.
256
 Good corporate governance practices also 
require that directors should declare their financial interests which can impair their objectivity in 
matters involving portfolio companies. The King III Report requires that directors should 
identify potential conflicts inherent in certain transactions and avoid them or disclose them in 
detail to the Board to allow it to formulate on how to manage them.
257
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3.2.8  The Exchange Control Regulations 1961 (the Regulations)  
When private equity funds invest outside SA they are required by the Regulations to seek to 
exchange control approval.
258
 Private equity funds’ foreign funders and LPs also require the 
approval of exchange control when there is a transfer of capital and profit. The Regulations 
require that any capital transferred cross the border by PEI firms be authorised by the SARB, 
whether it is direct or indirect. In relation to portfolio companies, financial dealings between a 
subsidiary in SA and a foreign or parent company outside SA are treated as being between a 
resident and non-resident, and should be approved by SARB.  
 
In the past, private equity funds could not get upfront approval for investments made outside of 
SA. South African private equity firms that invest in Swaziland, Lesotho and Namibia are no 
longer required to get authorisation for each and every investment. Such authorisations are 
required to be renewed after every three years. 
259
  
 
Exchange controls in SA are administered by the ‘Financial Surveillance Department (FSD) of 
the SARB and authorised dealers’ such as commercial banks which authorise transactions in 
certain specified circumstances.
260
 When South African private equity fund managers form 
parallel offshore structures, the foreign LPs and local South African LPs form a private capital 
pool that is managed by a single GP. All offshore financial transactions by PEIs, ‘including any 
terms of repayment, interest rates and draw-downs are required to be authorised by SARB.’261 
Consequently, the increase in private equity offshore structures is viewed to be a ‘direct result of 
the South African exchange control restrictions and various reasons relating to South African tax 
legislation.’262 
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3.3 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter sought to review the legislation and regulation applicable to private equity 
transactions or operations in SA. The financial legislative framework of PEIs in SA comprises 
both statute and common law, which results in a number of different pieces of separate 
legislation and regulatory rules.
263
 The various statutes and regulations that apply to PEIs include 
the FAIS Act
 
,
264
 the B-BBEE Act
 265
and the BEE policy framework, the Companies Act,
266
 the 
PFA,
267
 the FMA,
268
 the Regulations, the Competition Act, JSE Listing Requirements and the 
King Reports on Corporate Governance. A review of these diverse regulatory pieces of 
legislation shows that they all variably influence the PEIs industry. However, the diverse 
regulatory rules from different statutes can create an obscure system that may be manipulated 
and may make enforcement difficult. The statutes are not only fragmented but there is 
uncertainty if, for instance, the provision on financial products in the FAIS, applies to PEIs 
structured as en commandite partnerships or bewind trusts. The interest of investors in en 
commandite partnerships and bewind trusts which provides the investor with undivided 
ownership in the shares of portfolio companies is not a ‘security’ or ‘instrument’, but  could 
amount to a ‘combined product containing’ financial products,269 such as the shares acquired in 
the portfolio company.
270  
The cautious approach of the PEIs industry has been to market this 
interest within SA to authorised or licensed fund managers under FAIS.
271
 However, it is for 
such reasons that, it is essential to have a clear, consolidated and comprehensive Act or 
regulatory framework that regulates the activities unique to the private equity industry. It also 
gives the ‘regulatory authorities powers to intervene in the industry, should a problem arise 
and bring back stability to the financial sector’272 
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Regulation 28’s Conditions for Investment in Private Equity Funds273 of the PFA provides an 
ideal framework to be complied with by retirement funds that wish to invest in PEIs. However, 
the conditions regulate the conduct of pension trustees and legally, PEIs are not required to 
incorporate them in all their partnership agreements. The prescribed Conditions also show that 
South African pension funds are, in fact, able to structure their specific PEIs in accordance to 
their own inclinations.  This is viewed as a feature that can result in a number of regulatory 
challenges and ‘risks that could be potentially hazardous for some smaller, classes of 
investors.’274  
 
On a positive note there is a robust regulatory framework for financial markets in SA that is 
applicable to PEI activities which include IPOs, mergers and takeovers or buyouts. The 
regulatory measures in the FMA, JSE requirements and Companies Act are intended to offer 
essential structures to prohibit securities market abuse by the GPs without deterring growth and 
sustainability. To this day civil liability under FMA and its predecessors has been more 
successful in curbing insider trading in SA.
275
 This enhances investor confidence in South 
African PEIs as the effective regulation of PEIs involves both the standards imposed on public 
and private companies and the financial services regulatory requirements that are imposed 
directly on PEIs.
276
 Ideally these should function optimally and complement each other to 
encourage investment in PEIs in SA. However, determining and enforcing insider trading in the 
complex transactions of PEIs and amongst the various parties involved in the specific operations 
of PEIs may require centralised oversight.
277
 In sum, the ‘effectiveness of the FMA legislation 
and its predecessors to a large extent makes the South African regulatory framework one of best 
legislation in dealing with insider trading.’278  
 
Generally, private equity offers funds an opportunity to avoid the over-regulated approach to 
listed companies. However, internationally the regulatory requirements affecting the asset 
management industry and private equity funds in particular, have constantly been improved by 
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277  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag Gov 230. 
278  Richard Jooste 'Insider dealing in South Africa' (1990) 107 SALJ 589. 
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the relevant legislators or officials. Although registration of PEIs with a state agency is not yet 
mandatory in SA, the global reforms of private equity funds’ regulations are viewed as a 
means of bringing the privately pooled funds into the regulatory system. In addition, the FSB 
has taken significant steps to monitor transactions as well as specific, strategic parties, such as 
fund managers, in the financial services industry. However, it is mostly the GPs, and not the 
private equity fund itself, that are regulated by the FSB. This, coupled with the fragmented 
regulatory framework, might compromise effective regulation of the private equity industry in 
SA. There might be a need for SA to draw from other countries whose private equity industries 
have been consistently performing well in recent years. The next chapter discusses the regulation 
of PEIs in the UK in comparison with that of South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN THE FINANCIAL REGULATION OF 
PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED 
KINGDOM 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The UK is the leading ‘European jurisdiction in the management’ of PEIs and ‘it is second only 
to the US in terms of global importance.’ (Table 4.1)279  
 
Table 4.1: Private equity deal value for the year 2012 
 
Country ranking - Deal Value during 2012(uS$ million)      
1 United States Of America 171 180 11 Czech Republic 6 376 21 Netherlands 3 866 
2 United Kingdom 32 869 12 Cayman Islands 5 173 22 India 3 741 
3 Germany 19 587 13 China 5 093 23 Brazil 3 722 
4 France 11 897 14 Finland 4 566 24 Spain 3 626 
5 Belgium 9 317 15 Bermuda 4 496 25 Norway 2 868 
6 Italy 8 351 16 Denmark 4 399 26 Poland 2 300 
7 Egypt 7 676 17 Luxembourg 4 361 27 South Africa 1 600 
8 Russian Federation 7 250 18 Australia 3 963 28 Switzerland 1 547 
9 Sweden 6 807 19 Korea Republic Of 3 903 29 Dominican Republic 1 420 
10 Canada 6 504 20 Japan 3 879 30 Israel 1 339 
 
Source: KPMG & SAVCA Survey Report
280
 
                                               
279 British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association ‘Private equity explained’ available at  
http://www.bvca.co.uk/PrivateEquityExplained/FAQsinPrivateEquity.aspx (accessed 10 January 2015). 
280  KPMG and SAVCA ‘Venture capital and private equity industry performance survey of South Africa covering the  
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According to the ‘British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association’s (BVCA) 
Performance Measurement Survey of  2011, there are 501 funds that are managed in the UK’ and 
the British private equity funds’ performance data is the most comprehensive dataset to date.281 It 
would therefore be of interest to review the UK private equity industry and draw lessons for the 
improvement of the South African private equity industry. 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) that was amended by the Financial 
Services Act in 2012 is the most relevant Act with regards to PEIs in the UK. However, the 
FSMA is a framework Act only, and much of the detail is found in subordinate legislation, such 
as that relating to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). PEIs used to be regulated by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA). The contract between the private equity fund and the fund 
manager was subject to the FSA requirements.
282
 The FSA was abolished with effect from 1 
April 2013 and its provisions were divided among the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), 
the FCA and the Bank of England. The PRA governs the supervision of credit unions, insurers, 
banks, building societies and major investment firms. It oversees the prudential regulation of 
financial services alongside the FCA twin peaks regulatory structure.
283
 The FCA is responsible 
for regulating the manner business is carried out by all firms, including in entities that are 
controlled by the PRA.
284
 The Bank of England maintains monetary and financial stability in the 
UK.
285
  
 
This chapter reviews the key British legislation regulating PEIs in comparison with the South 
African regulatory system. A brief summary of the UK’s private equity legal structure is first 
provided in order to contextualise the discussion of the UK regulatory system. 
                                                                                                                                                       
2013 calendar year’ available at http://www.kpmg.com/za/en/issuesandinsights/articlespublications/general-industries- 
publications/pages/private-equity-survey-2014.aspx (accessed 5 November 2014). 
281 British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association ‘Private equity explained’ available at  
http://www.bvca.co.uk/PrivateEquityExplained/FAQsinPrivateEquity.aspx (accessed 10 January 2015). 
282  Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
  engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
283  Bank of England ‘Prudential Regulation Authority’ available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx   
(accessed 31 March 2015). 
284  Bank of England ‘Prudential Regulation Authority’ available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx   
(accessed 31 March 2015). 
285  Bank of England ‘Prudential Regulation Authority’ available at www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Pages/default.aspx   
(accessed 31 March 2015). 
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4.2 REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM IN COMPARISON WITH SOUTH AFRICA 
4.2.1 Brief review of the private equity legal structure in the UK 
The review of the South African private equity legal structures discussed in Chapter 2 showed 
that the main legal structures are the en commandite partnerships and bewind trusts of which the 
structure mainly used is the en commandite partnership. In SA an en commandite partnership 
does not have a separate legal persona from the partners that set it up.
286
 The en commandite 
partnership is governed by a partnership agreement and common law. On the other hand, the 
most common structure for the formation of private equity funds in England and Wales is an 
English Limited Partnership (Figure 2), which is established under the Limited Partnerships Act 
1907 of the UK.
287
 The Limited Partnerships Act regulates a number of issues that arise in the 
financial activities of private equity funds. Similarly, limited partnerships are commonly 
established in Scotland and Northern Ireland which are also governed by the Limited 
Partnerships Act. Under Scottish law limited partnerships have a ‘separate legal personality and 
are commonly used for feeder partnerships or as funds of funds but under English law a limited 
partnership is not a separate legal entity.’288 The Limited Partnerships in UK allow profits to be 
distributed to investors as capital rather than as income profits.
289
 The South African en 
commandite partnerships are akin to the Limited Partnership legal structures and both structures 
are suited to an illiquid asset class such as PEIs that generally has few redemption rights.  
 
                                               
286  Cassim FHI et al The Law Of Business Structure (2012)18. 
287 Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity  England and Wales’ (2011) available at  
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
288  Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at  
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
289 Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at  
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
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Figure 2: Structure of private equity investment in the United Kingdom 
 
Source: British Venture Capital Association  
 
In contrast to the en commandite partnerships in SA, Limited Partnerships in England and Wales 
are registered with the Registrar of Limited Partnerships
290
 at Companies House. The Registrar 
of Limited Partnerships in the Companies House is the same person as the Registrar of 
Companies. For as long as a Limited Partnership is not registered in the UK, it remains a general 
partnership.
291
 Companies House issues a certificate of registration after a registration statement 
has been signed by both general and limited
292
 partners and lodged with the Registrar. A Limited 
Partnership in the UK is required to submit details of the names of each and every LP as well as 
their capital contributions and the information is publicly available at the Companies House.
293
 
The requirement for all LPs to be registered is very useful in the regulation of PEIs in the UK. 
On the contrary, in SA, the en commandite partnership legal structure does not disclose the 
names of the undisclosed LP. However, the UK authorities maintain that the number and identity 
of LPs becomes relevant when LPs fail to comply with any requirements necessary to preserve 
their limited liability status. The identity of a LP is considered of relevance if the LP participates 
                                               
290 Section 15 Limited Partnerships Act 1907. 
291 Section 5 Limited Partnerships Act of 1907. 
292 Section 8 Limited Partnerships Act of 1907. 
293 Sections 3, 8 and 9 Limited Partnerships Act 1907. 
Members/Shareholders 
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in the ‘management of the Limited Partnership’ and thereby losing the limited liability status.294 
Although the Limited Partnerships Act does not define what constitutes ‘management’ for this 
purpose, it is generally accepted that a LP is not taking part in the management when the LP 
behaves within the rights under a partnership agreement.
 295
 In SA, the methods used for 
monitoring LPs so that they do not incur personal liability for the debts of the en commandite 
partnerships, are generally regarded as comparatively ‘simple and unsophisticated’.296 The South 
African FSB has not issued a list of permitted activities for LPs in PEIs as is the case in a number 
of countries, and as a result LPs adopt a ‘conservative and entirely passive approach’ to PEIs 
operations and activities.
297
 The Limited Partnerships Act in the UK provides for another 
circumstance a LP may partially lose unlimited liability status. When a partner withdraws capital 
while he remains a member of the fund it ‘renders him liable for the debts and obligations of the 
firm up to the amount which he has received back’.298 In other words, under English law, if the 
capital of a limited partnership is returned to investors before the partnership has been wound up, 
then the investors would lose their unlimited liability status to the extent of the capital that has 
been returned. To this end, the Limited Partnerships Act stipulates that an investor’s capital may 
not be returned prior to the termination of the LP. 
Just like in the South African law, the Limited Partnerships Act provides for a body corporate to 
be an LP. It however, ‘does not provide for body corporate being a GP.’299 Another similarity is 
that in both the UK and in SA the limited partnership agreement states the duties or 
responsibilities of the partners. However, the Limited Partnerships Act in the UK further 
provides for the ‘rights and obligations of the partners' and requires that all LPs be treated 
equally. It also provides that it is a statutory right of LPs to check the records of the partnership 
and consult with the GP on the plans and objectives of the Limited Partnership.
300
 On the other 
hand, in the South African regulatory framework, the partners of the private equity fund acting 
through the en commandite partnership’s GP are usually advised by an adviser that interacts 
                                               
294 Section 6 (1) Limited Partnerships Act of 1907.  
295 Section 6 Limited Partnerships Act of 1907. 
296  Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview'  
(2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
297  Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview'  
(2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
298 Section 4 (3) Limited Partnerships Act of 1907. 
299  Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity  England and Wales’ (2011) available at   
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
300 Section 6 (1) Limited Partnerships Act of 1907.  
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closely with the private equity firm. ‘Individual investors may also individually negotiate side 
letter terms with the fund or its’ adviser and after that it is obscure whether the side letter terms 
allow the partners to be treated equally. 
301
 
 
Normally a limited partnership agreement states that, upon bankruptcy or insolvency of the GP, a 
specified majority of LPs can elect whether or not to continue the limited partnership with a new 
GP. In contrast, the Limited Partnership Act provides that a partnership may not end because of 
‘the death or bankruptcy of a LP.’302 Since the Limited Partnership Act does not provide that the 
bankruptcy or insolvency of the GP results in the spontaneous dissolution of the partnership, the 
terms of the LP agreement are determinative.
303
 En commandite partnership agreements in SA 
provide for the removal and replacement of the GP in terms of common law legal requirements. 
Such removal and replacement would normally require the consent of all the creditors of the en 
commandite partnership.  
 
A striking difference between PEIs in the UK and those in SA is that in the UK various PEIs 
firms trade on the London Stock Exchange, including ‘venture capital funds, buyout funds, 
development capital funds, turnaround/restructuring funds, general funds, and funds of funds.’304 
These private equity funds are typically structured as offshore companies that are ‘listed on the 
London Stock Exchange’s main market, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) or the 
Specialist Fund Market (SFM).’305 The SFM was formed in 2007 as a market intended to attract 
sophisticated investors and limited partnerships are also eligible to be listed on the SFM. In SA, 
public companies are bought and sold on the JSE but private firms such as PEIs are not. The end 
result of this is that public companies are highly liquid, tradable daily and settlement is certain 
through a regulated stock exchange. Conversely, private companies are difficult to trade as any 
transaction must be negotiated directly between the buyer and seller. The key benefits of listing 
PEIs is ‘increased liquidity for investors as they are able to trade their interests on the listed 
                                               
301  Loubser J, Viviers J & Minnaar A ‘The private equity review’ available at   
http://www.ens.co.za/news/news_article.aspx?iID=1024&iType=4 (accessed 8 November 2015). 
302 Section 4 (2) Limited Partnerships Act of 1907.  
303 Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at  
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
304 Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
305  Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at   
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
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market, and the fund would have access to investors who prefer to, or are required to, invest only 
in listed securities.’306  
 
As pointed out earlier, the fund managers of PEIs in the UK are authorised by the FCA and PRA 
before carrying out regulated activities. However, there are other subordinate regulatory 
measures such as the Criminal Justice Act, 1993 (the CJA), the EU’s Alternative Investment 
Fund Managers Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFM Directive), the Bribery Act 2010, the Companies 
Act 2006, and The Walker Guidelines, which support the FCA so as to make the regulatory 
framework of PEIs comprehensive. Regulation of PEIs in the UK is discussed in the next few 
sections in such a way as to emphasise the differences with PEIs’ regulation in SA. At the end a 
summary of similarities between regulation of PEIs in the UK and SA is provided. 
 
4.2.2 The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) 
 
Similar to SA’s FSB, the FCA is also a fund manager level focused authority. In addition to 
promoters and fund managers, the FCA also requires any ‘employees or officers of authorised 
firms that carry out key functions in a fund to be individually authorised by the FCA.’307 Private 
equity fund managers in SA ‘may not act or offer to act as financial services providers unless’ 
they are approved by the Registrar of Financial Services and have the required licence under the 
FAIS Act.
308
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the FSB also does not directly regulate the private equity 
funds in SA. The growing influence of EU legislation and standards on UK policy-making and 
supervisory practices has resulted in the FCA incorporating the EU and international 
requirements. For that reason, in terms of regulating private equity funds, the FCA has a much 
broader regulatory framework than the FSB in SA.  
 
There is an inherent risk posed to LPs by investments due to factors, such as, the complexity of 
the financial products, lock ins and carried interest or financial charges by the fund managers. 
Therefore the British government allows the FCA to intervene and instruct a financial service 
                                               
306  Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
307  The Financial Conduct Authority ‘Approach to regulation’ (2011) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/fca (accessed 18  
  February 2015). 
308
 Section 4 (2) FAIS Act 37 of 2002.  
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provider to remove or correct ‘misleading financial promotions,’309 and ‘to publish a warning 
notice’310 with regards to a financial product identified. Through a new approach, called product 
intervention, the FCA can intervene earlier in the product life cycle, inspecting products and 
requiring firms to have in place efficient structures or completely eliminate the financial product.  
 
One of the objectives of the FCA is to be proactive in regulating PEIs and hedge funds that may 
pose a risk to the financial markets. It builds on the risks PEIs pose to the economy as outlined 
and categorised in a discussion paper by the FSA in 2006. The FCA aims for early detection and 
deterrence of risky conduct in order to protect clients as well as maintain the integrity of markets 
and competitive edge.
311
 The FCA also has the power to investigate firms and individuals which 
enhances its credible deterrence strategy
312
 and firms are continuously subject to the 
requirements in the FCA Handbook of Rules and Guidance.  
 
4.2.3 Criminal Justice Act, 1993 (the CJA) 
 
Within the CJA is a regime that deals with insider trading which affects PEIs normally in the exit 
stage or IPOs. The CJA Part V seeks to ‘i) prevent individuals from dealing in price affected 
securities on the basis of insider information (ii) prohibit one to encourage another to deal in 
price affected securities on the basis of insider information and iii) prohibit disclosure of insider 
information to another.’313 The insider trading offence in the UK can lead to a sentence of up to 
seven years or a fine.  
 
The South African law also recognises the conflict of interest in funds that trade on financial 
markets and take part in PEIs activities. The provisions of The FMA
314
 of SA apply to 
individuals, partnerships, trusts and juristic persons while, in contrast, the English CJA applies to 
                                               
309 Section 388 FSMA 2000. 
310 Section 387 FSMA 2000. 
311  The Financial Conduct Authority ‘Approach to regulation’ (2011) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/fca (accessed 18  
February 2015).  
312  The Financial Conduct Authority ‘Approach to regulation’ (2011) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/fca (accessed 18  
February 2015).  
313  Criminal Justice Act of 1993. 
314  Act 19 of 2012. 
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individuals and has not been extended to juristic persons.
315
 Another provision of the FMA in SA 
that makes it effective in curbing insider trading is the exclusion of international theories, such 
as, Chinese Walls. The theory of a Chinese Wall ‘seeks to protect juristic persons from incurring 
liability for insider trading due to inside knowledge of their employees being attributed to them 
in law.’316 The FMA, by not introducing Chinese Walls as a formal legal defence, has made it 
mandatory for all juristic persons, including trusts and partnerships, to make full and prompt 
disclosure of all material corporate information.
317
 The FMA also goes a step further than 
legislation in other jurisdictions, such as, the English CJA, by making ‘discouraging another 
person to deal’ an offence while under the CJA it does not constitute an offence.318 
 
Under the CJA in the UK for an offence to be committed a territorial link must be established 
with the UK. In order for the dealing offence to be committed the individual must be physically 
present in the UK at the time that the act forming the deal ‘or the regulated market on which the 
dealing occurs must be in the UK
319
 or the professional intermediary with or through whom the 
offence was committed must be in the UK at the time.’320 The FMA of SA permits the FSB to 
pursue, investigate and prosecute persons who commit the offence of insider trading while based 
in a foreign country and on a foreign market.
321
 However, this provision is perceived to have 
overstretched SA’s regulatory ambit and the cost of pursuing prosecutions on a global scale is 
viewed as prohibitive. The timeous enforcement and recognition of foreign judgements in cross-
border market abuse that occurs in foreign markets is also seen as a challenge. 
322
 
 
In contrast to the English CJA which regulates, inter alia, insider trading in the UK and imposes 
criminal liability only, the FMA in SA also imposes statutory civil liability for insider trading. 
Furthermore, SA ‘was the first country to initiate civil prosecution of insider trading with the 
                                               
315  Richard Jooste 'Insider dealing in South Africa' (1990) 107 SALJ 589. 
316 Harrods Ltd v Lemon [1931] 2 KB 157 (CA).  
317 Cassim R ‘Some aspects of insider trading- has the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 gone too far?’ (2007) 19 SA  
Merc LJ 57. 
318 Cassim R ‘Some aspects of insider trading- has the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 gone too far?’ (2007) 19 SA  
Merc LJ 57. 
319 Section 62 (2) of the CJA. 
320 Section 62 (1) of the CJA. 
321 Cassim R ‘Some aspects of insider trading- has the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004 gone too far?’ (2007) 19 SA 
Merc LJ 57. 
322  Chitimira H ‘A historical overview of the regulation of market abuse under the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004’  
(2014) 47 De Jure 2 310- 328. 
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added advantage of compensation for those prejudiced by insider trading.’323 In comparison, a 
small number of cases in jurisdictions, such as, the US and the UK, that are amongst the leaders 
in insider trading legislation, have been referred for criminal prosecution.
324
 The civil penalties 
can be the equivalent of the profit made from such a transaction and are in the form of ‘a penalty 
of up to R1 million plus three times the profit made, with interest, and the cost of such a 
lawsuit.’325 In response to various listed instruments that trade globally, the FSB has agreements 
on insider trading and market abuse ‘with the FCA in the UK and the Securities Exchange 
Commission in the US.’326 Civil liability in SA under the FMA and its predecessors has been 
more effective in reducing insider trading in SA, showing that South African law is amongst the 
most effective and unprejudiced regimes in the world.
327
 
 
4.2.4 The EU Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM Directive) 
 
The regulation of PEIs in the UK now conforms to the regional regulatory framework through 
the EU’s AIFM Directive that emanated from the lessons learnt during the financial crisis of 
2008/9
328
 and was transposed into UK law in 2013.
329
 The AIFM Directive was developed in 
response to international pressure for the regulation of PEIs, in spite of the objections from the 
BVCA that this would negatively impact the industry.
330
 Private equity fund managers in the UK 
now need the FCA’s approval for any operations that are within the AIFM Directive framework. 
The AIFM Directive is aimed at extending the rules that oversee banks and investment firms to 
PEIs. It seeks to harmonise the EU-wide regulatory regime for managers of PEIs and impacts on 
many of the duties and activities of managers as regards EU based funds. This has led to 
increased regulation related to marketing of PEIs in the region, with stricter laws on risk control 
and prescribed ranges of GP’s remuneration and bonuses.  
                                               
323 JSE Insider Trading Booklet (2013) 4. 
324 JSE Insider Trading Booklet (2013) 4. 
325 Section 82 Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012. 
326  Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview' (2014) 
available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
327  Richard Jooste 'Insider dealing in South Africa' (1990) 107 SALJ 589. 
328 Onions A et al ‘Private equity and venture capital’  (2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/topic0-103-1350  
(accessed 12 January 2015). 
329  Onions A et al  ‘Private equity and venture capital’  (2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/topic0-103-1350  
(accessed 12 January 2015). 
330 Onions A et al  ‘Private equity and venture capital’ (2014) available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/topic0-103-1350  
(accessed 12 January 2015). 
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An essential requirement transposed by the AIFM Directive is that PEIs are required to increase 
transparency with regards to investee firms. The portfolio companies held by private equity 
funds are usually private investments and are therefore not governed by the strict requirements of 
disclosure and transparency. However, the AIFM Directive requires ‘transparency with regards 
to employees, business strategies, setting up of time-limited precautions against the loss of 
capital and makes proposals for managing conflicts in portfolio companies.’331 The AIFM 
Directive also requires EU based funds, or funds promoted in the EU, to monitor cash flows and 
supervise the fund manager’s activities.332   
These requirements make the EU reporting requirements different from SA, ‘because the AIFM 
Directive is based on a binding legal requirement, not on voluntary disclosure’ or a partnership 
agreement between a GP and investors/funds.
333
 South African PEIs are not regulated by a 
specific regional framework. However, the South African ‘FSB has entered into co-operation 
agreements with a number of EU member states under the auspices of the AIFM Directive.’334 
 
4.2.5 The Bribery Act 2010 
 
The Bribery Act of 2010 in the UK is among the strictest legislation on bribery internationally 
and introduces a strict liability offence against both companies and partnerships for failing to 
prevent bribery. The Bribery Act seeks to address the requirements of the 1997 OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention. It makes it an offence for a firm ‘to be covering an offering, promising an 
advantage, giving an advantage, and requesting an advantage,
335
 and agreeing to receive or 
                                               
331  European Corporate Governance Institute The Regulation Of Hedge Funds And Private Equity: A Case  
Study In The Development Of The EU’s Regulatory Response To The Financial Crisis Working Paper  
N°.176/2011 (2011) available at http://stefanopagliari.net/helleiner_and_pagliari_--2.pdf (accessed 24 February 2015). 
332 European Corporate Governance Institute The Regulation Of Hedge Funds And Private Equity: A Case  
Study In The Development Of The EU’s Regulatory Response To The Financial Crisis Working Paper  
N°.176/2011(2011) available at http://stefanopagliari.net/helleiner_and_pagliari_--2.pdf (accessed 24 February 2015). 
333  Cumming D & Walz U ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’ (2010) 41 Journal of International  
Business Studies 730. 
334  Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview' (2014) 
available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
335 Section 1 The Bribery Act 2010. 
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accept an advantage’.336 The Bribery Act makes it an offence for partnerships and companies to 
pay or receive bribes and extends the offence to the bribing of foreign public officials. 
 
Unlike previous legislation, the Bribery Act places strict liability upon a limited partnership for 
failure to prevent bribes being given. An entity can be liable for the actions of an associated 
person.
337
 Nevertheless, the Act provides that should an offence be committed, it will be a 
‘defence that the company had adequate procedures in place to attempt to prevent’ persons 
associated with the fund from undertaking bribery or to prevent bribery.’338 This entails that the 
corporate responsibility is no longer dependent on the position of the employee who commits the 
offence but the entire corporate culture.
339
 The Act can impose ‘imprisonment and potentially 
unlimited fines.’340 
 
The Bribery Act is of great relevance to the PEIs market as there is a high chance for leakage of 
information or bribery in the industry due to various individuals who participate in private equity 
deals. The definition of what constitutes a bribe is sufficiently wide as to cover political 
contributions in certain circumstances. The Bribery Act requires private equity firms to also 
consider their entertainment programs for investors, in particular foreign public officials, such as, 
officers at sovereign wealth funds.
341
 This is particularly important in cases of offshore 
investments that are located in areas with high risk of corruption.
342
  
 
Similarly, SA has a consolidated strong, legislative framework which seeks to combat bribery 
and corruption. The aspects of bribery and corruption are found in the Prevention and Combating 
of Corrupt Activities Act,
343
 the Financial Intelligence Centre Act,
344
 the Companies Act
345
 and 
the King lll Report. The Corruption Act seeks to eliminate corruption and the Act provides for 
                                               
336 Section 2 The Bribery Act 2010. 
337 Section 7 The Bribery Act 2010. 
338 Section 7 The Bribery Act 2010. 
339 Nwafor AO ‘Corporate criminal responsibility: a comparative analysis’ (2013) 57 Journal of African Law 106. 
340  Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at   
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
341 Section 6 The Bribery Act 2010. 
342 Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
343  Act 12 of 2004.  
344  Act 38 of 2001. 
345  Act 71 of 2008. 
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‘specific offences such as the accessory offence and inducing offence.’346 The challenge may be 
in the enforcement system. The major differences of the corruption and bribery regulatory 
framework in SA with that in the UK is that the UK Bribery Act consolidates all of these aspects, 
presents them in an understandable way and also makes it an offence if companies fail to put in 
place adequate prevention procedures that are proportionate to the bribery risks that the PEI 
faces. In addition, the Bribery Act encourages the private sector to establish bribery prevention 
policies as part of good corporate governance and the Act has an extra -territorial application.
347
  
 
4.2.6 The UK Companies Act 2006  
 
The principal duty of the GP is to manage the activities of the private equity funds. The contracts 
between the GP and LPs made in the UK and SA have to be clear on the concept of ‘gross 
negligence’ as distinct from ‘ordinary negligence’ due to the differences in how the two 
jurisdictions recognise the two. In both countries individual partners cannot limit personal 
liability for negligence where the risks are felt to be excessive. Generally the English law 
recognises the concept of ‘negligence’ but it has no concept of ‘gross negligence’ as distinct 
from ‘ordinary negligence’. In the event of a dispute it is the intentions and also the high level of 
neglect or indifference to potential risk that are analysed. The principal of ‘gross negligence’ in 
English law is not defined and ‘gross negligence is interpreted by the English courts on a case by 
case basis, with reference to the wording and context’ of the entire limited partnership 
agreement.
348
 English courts have on several cases been required to interpret limited partnership 
contracts that include the phrase ‘gross negligence.’ 
 
On the other hand, the South African law provides for ‘gross negligence’. The South African 
Companies Act provides that ‘a company must not carry on its business recklessly, with gross 
negligence, with intent to defraud any person, or for any fraudulent purpose.’349 The private 
equity environment in SA currently tends to exempt the GP from all other liability except for 
                                               
346  Section 3 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004. 
347 Section 12 (5) The Bribery Act 2010. 
348  Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at  
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
349 Section 22 (1) Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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‘gross negligence, criminal conduct and material breach of the partnership agreement’.350 In both 
jurisdictions, risk avoidance is often required to be exercised when drafting limited partnership 
agreements in order for the GPs to get clarity on their duties and responsibilities. The contracts 
between the GP and LP would also clearly guide the courts on what constitutes ‘gross 
negligence’. 
4.2.7 The Walker Guidelines 
The South African private equity industry through the Private Equity Survey annual reports 
published by KPMG and SAVCA seeks to show its commitment to financial transparency and 
provides data to support the industry’s contribution to the South African economy. The Private 
Equity Survey gives an overview or summary of the performance and structure of PEIs in SA. In 
the UK authorities have gone a step further by requiring individual portfolio companies to also 
publish annual reports of their financial performance. This was in response to the increased 
examination and negative publicity the private equity industry encountered in 2007 from the 
media, trade unions and politicians which resulted in the Treasury Select Committee hearings. 
Sir David Walker published a set of guidelines at the request of the BVCA that require greater 
transparency and disclosure within the private equity industry and their investee companies.
351
 
The Walker Guidelines and the supporting Guidelines Monitoring Group (GMG) ‘provide a set 
of self-regulatory rules, and establish oversight and disclosure comparable to those faced by 
companies on the FTSE 350 stock exchange.’352  
The EU’s AIFM Directive is legally binding but the Walker Guidelines operate on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis and are applicable to large entities, with any non-compliance being required to be 
explained on the company’s website.353 The Walker Guidelines also prescribes that portfolio 
company reports ‘should focus on substance rather than form, that is, the economic reality of 
                                               
350 Khoza F ‘Retirement funds in private equity funds: some issues to consider’ available at   
http://www.bowman.co.za/News-Blog/Blog/retirement-funds-investment-private-equity-funds (accessed 28 December 
2014).  
351  British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association ‘Private equity explained’ available at  
http://www.bvca.co.uk/PrivateEquityExplained/FAQsinPrivateEquity.aspx (accessed 10 January 2015). 
352 British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association ‘Private equity explained’ available at  
http://www.bvca.co.uk/PrivateEquityExplained/FAQsinPrivateEquity.aspx (accessed 10 January 2015). 
353 Addleshaw Goddard ‘The Walker Guidelines for disclosure and transparency in private equity’ available at   
http://www.addleshawgoddard.com/asset_store/document/walker_guidelines_-_checklist_95735.pdf  (accessed 25  
February 2015). 
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limited partnerships rather than its legal values.’354 According to the Walker Guidelines portfolio 
companies are required to publish financial statements and annual reports on their websites 
within a period of six months after the annual shut down.
355
 During the year, investee companies 
are also required to publish within three months after mid-year, a mid-year report that does not 
include accounting records but describes the progress made to that point.
356
 In addition, the 
Walker Guidelines requires a ‘business review that substantially conforms to the expanded 
disclosure obligations applicable to quoted companies under section 417 (5) of the Companies 
Act.’357 In SA only public companies are required to publish annual reports publicly.  Private 
companies are not compelled to do so and this makes it difficult for potential investors to obtain 
financial information on some private companies. Self-regulation of the private equity industry 
has not yet developed to the levels the UK has reached. 
 
4.3 SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SOUTH AFRICA IN 
THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS 
The main similarities exist in the regulations related to money laundering and takeovers and 
mergers as outlined below. 
 
4.3.1 The Money Laundering Regulations 2007  
 
Money laundering ‘is the process by which the proceeds of crime are converted into assets which 
appear to have a legitimate origin.’358 PEIs in the UK are required to ‘establish and maintain 
effective systems and controls that enable them, among other things, to recognise, assess, and 
control the risk of money laundering’ or terrorist financing.359 Similarly, GPs of hedge funds and 
                                               
354  British Private Equity and Venture Capital Association ‘Private equity explained’ available at  
http://www.bvca.co.uk/PrivateEquityExplained/FAQsinPrivateEquity.aspx (accessed 10 January 2015). 
355  Addleshaw Goddard ‘The Walker Guidelines for disclosure and transparency in private equity’ available at   
http://www.addleshawgoddard.com/asset_store/document/walker_guidelines_-_checklist_95735.pdf  (accessed 25  
February 2015).  
356  Addleshaw Goddard ‘The Walker Guidelines for disclosure and transparency in private equity’ available at   
http://www.addleshawgoddard.com/asset_store/document/walker_guidelines_-_checklist_95735.pdf  (accessed 25  
February 2015). 
357 Addleshaw Goddard ‘The Walker Guidelines for disclosure and transparency in private equity’ available at   
http://www.addleshawgoddard.com/asset_store/document/walker_guidelines_-_checklist_95735.pdf  (accessed 25  
February 2015). 
358  The Money Laundering Regulations 2007. 
359  Davids E & Hale A Mergers and acquisitions review (2012)  available at  ` 
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PEIs in SA are subject to the Financial Intelligence Centre Act
360
 which monitors the recognition 
of earnings from illegitimate operations as well as methods of eliminating money laundering. 
Private equity funds in SA are required to adhere to anti-money laundering requirements by 
monitoring investor activities and establishing internal procedures to train staff to guard against 
money laundering.’361 They are also required to report any indication of money laundering to the 
applicable authorities. 
 
The GPs of the Limited Partnerships in the UK are required to follow the rules and regulations of 
the FCA on money laundering, and also the obligations set out in other statutes, including the 
Terrorism Act 2000, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and the Money Laundering Regulations 
2007. The Money Laundering Regulations in the UK requires private equity funds to nominate 
an officer who receives internal reports with regards to any knowledge or suspicion of money 
laundering structures to eradicate potential money laundering or terrorist financing activities.
362
 
PEI firms in the UK are required to prepare reports that cover record keeping, risk assessment, 
compliance communication and management of money laundering policies.
363
 
  
4.3.2 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 
 
Private equity dealings, such as, buyouts, IPOs and takeovers are generally subject to strict 
regulations as they are considered risky financial transactions.
364
 Generally, buyouts of listed 
companies by private equity funds in SA are not common.
365
 In the UK the acquisition of a 
publicly listed companies is regulated by the ‘City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code), 
the Companies Act 2006, the Financial Services & Markets Act 2000, the Model Code on 
                                                                                                                                                       
 http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/MergersandAcquisitionsReview-4thEdition- SouthAfrica.pdf  
(accessed 10 January 2015). 
360  Act 38 of 2001. 
361  Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001. 
362  Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at  
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
363 Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at  
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
364  Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
365  Roderick L, Kennedy-Good S & Wellsted A ‘Private equity in South Africa : market and regulatory overview' (2014) 
available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/4-376-4687 (accessed 3 January 2015). 
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Directors' Dealings, the Listing Rules and the Criminal Justice Act 1993.’366 The takeover 
regulations provided for in the Companies Act
367
 of SA as discussed in Chapter 3, are mainly 
influenced by the Code of the UK.
368
 The Code aims to ensure that takeovers are carried out in a 
well organised and regulated environment. It mainly ensures that there is fair treatment and well 
informed decision making by the shareholders of the offeree company involved in a takeover.
369
 
In sum, the Code seeks to uphold, together with other statutes and supervisory establishments, 
the stability of the capital markets.  
 
4.4  CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to compare the regulation of PEIs in SA with one of the leading 
global jurisdictions in relation to private equity, namely, the UK and draw lessons from it.  As a 
result of SA’s history, there are generally a number of similarities in its regulation of PEIs and 
the regulations provided by English law. The fields of South African company law and 
insolvency have also been influenced by English law.
370
 However, the South African law is 
mainly based on the Roman-Dutch Law and has continued to develop through new legislation 
and the influence of court decisions. Therefore there are also various striking contrasts between 
the private equity regulatory system of the UK and the corresponding South African system.   
 
As outlined above, the most common legal structure in the UK is mainly governed by the 
consolidated and comprehensive Limited Partnerships Act. On the contrary, en commandite 
partnerships in SA are mainly governed by common law. In addition, through the UK’s main 
regulatory body, the FCA, there is a shift towards a proactive, risk management approach 
through early intervention and enforcement to avoid offences. There are also evolving statutory 
reforms that show that a fault element should prove that the fund did not set and monitor a 
                                               
366  Barry B ‘Getting the deal through – private equity England and Wales’ (2011) available at   
www.gettingthedealthrough.com (accessed 10 January 2015). 
367 Act 71 of 2008. 
368 Davids E & Hale A Mergers and acquisitions review (2012) available at  
 http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/MergersandAcquisitionsReview-4thEdition-  . 
SouthAfrica.pdf  (accessed 10 January 2015). 
369  Davids E & Hale A Mergers and acquisitions review (2012)  available at 
 http://www.bowman.co.za/FileBrowser/ArticleDocuments/MergersandAcquisitionsReview-4thEdition-  . 
SouthAfrica.pdf (accessed 10 January 2015).  
370  Geach W & Yeats J Trusts (2007) 11. 
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business culture that ensures the identified offence is not committed.
371
 For instance, under the 
Bribery Act, a fund is liable unless it is possible to show that sufficient policies and measures to 
deter such offences. Generally, the UK regulatory framework, through the EU’s Directive 
2011/61/EU and the Walker Guidelines places a strong emphasis on disclosure and transparency 
by requiring funds to demonstrate their business integrity through the publication of their annual 
reports. The regulatory requirements have been refined such that the AIFM Directive aims at 
extending the stringent rules that regulate banks and investment companies to hedge funds and 
PEIs. Another striking contrast between the UK and SA, which was discussed in Chapter 3, is 
the B-BBEE. The South African government and other development agencies recognise the 
private equity asset class as one of the effective vehicles for addressing economic transformation 
and inequalities. The UK does not have legislation that is similar to B-BBEE Act.  
 
Although there are major differences between PEIs’ regulation in SA and that of the UK, a 
number of noteworthy similarities exist in the two jurisdictions. Both jurisdictions have 
legislation that targets corruption, insider trading and money laundering. In addition, the South 
African regulation of takeovers and mergers is mainly influenced by the City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers of the UK.  
 
Apart from having a consolidated legislation regulating PEIs, generally, there has been an 
expansion in the scope of the regulation of PEIs in the UK to include more co-regulation and 
regional requirements to the traditional, conservative common law. For example, the UK 
regulatory framework now includes the EU’s AIFM Directive and the Walker Guidelines. This 
integration of regional requirements has helped the UK to open up new markets in the region. 
The UK regulatory framework also now has a number of requirements regarding strategic 
deterrence, disclosure and transparency, three factors that are very important in attracting and 
retaining investors. This could partly be the reason why the UK remains globally competitive 
and continues to attract more investors than the South African private equity market. Therefore, 
there are regulatory initiatives in the governance of PEIs in the UK that can be recommended so 
as to improve the regulation of PEIs in SA. These lessons will be further highlighted in the 
                                               
371  Nwafor AO ‘Corporate criminal responsibility: a comparative analysis’ (2013) 57 Journal of African Law 97.  
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recommendations discussed in Chapter 6. The next chapter discusses the implications of the 
South African regulatory system on the private equity industry. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA ON PRIVATE 
EQUITY INVESTMENTS  
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
During the past decade, and notably between 2007 and 2012, PEIs in SA slackened in the value 
and amount of deals. One of the major reasons that has been linked to this low performance was 
the higher cost of debt.
372
 Although market forces have always been regarded as the ultimate 
regulators of PEIs internationally, there has also been a concern about the private equity 
environment being marred by increased risk. The risk has come from ‘overleveraged 
transactions, an increase in potential costs to investors from insider trading, price fixing’373 and 
in general a lack of or limited transparency regarding PEI transactions. As a result the regulatory 
environment has also, it has been proposed, affected the attractiveness of the private equity 
industry since the legal system is an essential factor in the attracting or investing funds. The 
trend, particularly by the G20, IOSCO, the EU and the UK regulatory framework, has moved 
towards regulating PEIs and the fund managers.
374
 This chapter discusses the implications of the 
current regulatory factors on private equity performance in SA. These implications together with 
the UK regulatory regime will guide the recommendations for improvement which will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  
The implications discussed here have been identified mainly in the FAIS Act, B-BBEE Act and 
en commandite partnerships. 
5.2 Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act (FAIS Act) 37 of 2002  
                                               
 
 
372 Davids E & Hale A Mergers and Acquisitions Review (2012) 4. 
373  Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
374  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag Gov 200.  
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The conduct of private equity fund managers in SA is regulated through the FAIS Act.
375
  PEIs 
fund managers are, broadly speaking required to register as financial services providers under the 
FAIS Act. However, the regulation of PEI managers does not amount to the regulation of the 
fund itself. Current trends show that the underlying risks in PEIs are not limited to the private 
equity fund managers only. ‘Leveraged finance providers, transaction advisers, investors, 
portfolio companies as well as the relevant equity, debt and related derivative products’ also pose 
risk to some degree.
376
 In addition allowing the private equity funds to regulate themselves 
results in complex conflicts of interests, which could negatively affect investor confidence.
377
 
Although industry standards address a number of abuses, the process of allocating funds to 
various investments, participating  in different stages of ‘proprietary and advisory activities, and 
taking up more than one role in a single transaction’ can undermine self-regulation.378 Ensuring 
compliance to industry regulations can be challenging especially on issues of conflicts of 
interest.   
In addition, PEIs use considerable amounts of debt in their operations and can consequently pose 
a systematic risk to the financial sector. The global financial meltdown showed that ‘individual 
financial institutions can be a source of systemic risk to financial stability because of their size, 
complexity, interconnectedness and provision of essential services and infrastructure.’379 The 
risk that private equity funds pose is widespread and leaving funds to regulate themselves may 
discourage risk-averse investors. Another factor which may discourage investment in SA is that 
of limited transparency such as that prescribed in the EU’s legally binding AIFM Directive. 
Providing funding to another private equity firm which operates in an unregulated private equity 
territory, such as SA, may present a higher risk than a similar business which operates out of one 
well-regulated territory. The AIFM Directive further provides for the disclosures by portfolio 
companies to investors and to the Registrar of Companies. This type of transparency is yet to be 
transposed in the South African law.  
                                               
375 Ritchie LS The Private Equity Review 3 ed (2014) 11. 
376  Financial Services Authority Discussion Paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
377  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag Gov 226. 
378  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag Gov 226. 
379  Davis K ‘Regulatory Reform Post the Global Financial Crisis: An overview’ available at   
http://www.apec.org.au/docs/11_CON_GFC/Regulatory%20Reform%20Post%20GFC-%20Overview%20Paper.pdf  
(accessed 28 February 2014). 
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During the course of turning around investee companies GPs report to LPs the value of portfolio 
companies and that of unrealised investments.
380
 However, the valuations of these illiquid assets 
is difficult as well as subject to discretion as funds are not required by law to disclose this. 
‘Internal rates of return (IRR) can be calculated on a number of assumptions but the assumptions 
made make a’ big difference to the results. It is ‘rare for two firms to calculate IRR in exactly the 
same way.’381 While a standardised system of valuation is yet to be set internationally, the 
Registrar of Pension Funds has prescribed the use of International Private Equity and Venture 
Capital Valuation Guidelines
382
 (these Guidelines have been adopted by over 25 countries 
globally).
383
 The use of PEIs valuations in an economy is widespread and having a standard 
method of valuing PEIs that is enforced by law would allow investors to make clear comparisons 
of investment options. This would particularly apply to offshore or regional investments to 
reduce any distortions in the allocation of capital across countries. Unless this is addressed, it is 
likely that some investors may not include PEIs among investment options, which might be 
contributing to the sub-optimal performance of the economy.
384
  
 
5.3 The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (B-BBEE Act) of 2003 
 
One of the main influential regulative instruments of private equity investments is the B-BBEE 
Act.
385
 The major feature of the B-BBEE framework has been the provision for equity ownership 
by Blacks. Consequently, a number of South African firms ‘concluded transactions in which they  
disposed of a significant equity stake, generally up to 25.1 per cent, to Black shareholders.’386 
The sector and generic Codes of Good Practice have brought significant changes to the PEI 
industry.
387
  The Codes give a better B- BBEE rating to portfolio companies whose shares are 
held by private equity funds that are owned by Black managers.
388
 The total number of points 
                                               
380 Cumming D & Walz U ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’ (2010) 41 Journal of International  
Business Studies 730. 
381  Cumming D & Walz U ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’ (2010) 41 Journal of International  
Business Studies 730. 
382  Condition 8 Regulation 28. 
383 Section 5(2) (e) Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956. 
384  Cumming D & Walz U ‘Private equity returns and disclosure around the world’ (2010) 41 Journal of International  
Business Studies 730. 
385  The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 2003. 
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387  Paragraph 5 the BEE Codes 26. 
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has been increased with effect from 1 May 2015 making it more difficult for portfolio companies 
to ‘achieve level four to level one BEE status.’389 The clarifications in the generic Codes of Good 
Practice that came into effect on 1 May 2015 also tackle the issue of fronting practices which had 
become an obstacle in effectively implementing B-BBEE in PEIs.  The effectiveness of these 
amendments remains to be seen.  
 
Critics of the B-BBEE Act argue that the Act has an unfair emphasis on race rather than merit, 
qualifications and experience.
390
 In 2010, Pravin Gordhan, the then Minister of Finance, said: 
‘BEE policies have not worked and have not made South Africa a fairer or more prosperous 
country.’391 In a newspaper commentary by William Gumede,392 translated from Afrikaans, his 
closing remarks were that ‘South Africa will never reach its full potential if we do not cultivate a 
system based on merit.' Considering that the survival of private equity depends on investment 
acumen, such concerns, when not fully addressed can negatively affect investor confidence and 
may contribute to reduced foreign PEI activity. It could also be for this reason that, given the 
perceived, unique risk profile of PEIs and the B-BBEE concerns, the borrowings made for B-
BBEE ‘transactions tend to attract particularly high interest rates.’393 In the statistical results of 
the survey by Professor Kruger, respondents did not think that BEE positively impacts their 
‘companies’ performance, overall international competitiveness, financial performance, business 
ethics or transparency.’394 In addition the regulation is viewed as falling short of building 
competitiveness due to both the flight and unemployment of essential, skilled workers. 
Therefore, there  is need not only to close loopholes and avoid creating more economic 
imbalances through the B-BBEE Act, but also to incentivise effective Black investment without 
compromising investor confidence. 
5.4 En commandite partnerships 
                                               
389  Werksmans Attorneys ‘Amendments to the BBBEE Act and the Codes explained’ (2014) available at  
http://www.werksmans.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/041763-WERKSMANS-bbbee-booklet.pdf (accessed 17  
May 2015). 
390  Krüger LP  ‘The impact of black economic empowerment (BEE) on South African businesses: focusing on ten 
dimensions of business performance’ (2011) 15(1) Southern African Business Review 207. 
391  Jeffery A ‘BEE is flawed and should be scrapped’ Mail and Guardian 18 January 2013. 
392  Gumede W ‘Scrap BEE, follow merit for a strong SA’ Rapport, Weekliks 26 February 2012. 
393  Davids E & Hale A Mergers and acquisitions review (2012)  available at  ` 
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A partnership in SA has no separate legal existence or (in general) it has no limited liability. In a 
number of cases, statute has had to some extent make inroads into this general principle 
particularly for litigation purposes, in insolvency law, tax law and procedural law. Generally, in 
common law after dissolution of a partnership, a creditor may sue any individual partner for the 
full amount of the partnership debts.
395
 However, in an en commandite partnership 
commanditarian partners are only liable to the extent they have contributed. A related concern 
on en commandite partnership would involve the unclear ownership of economic risk that could 
create costly barriers for lenders to negotiate settlements.
396
 It is possible that the excessive 
leverage the private equity industry needs, coupled with the obscure ownership of economic risk, 
could discourage risk averse lenders or lead to a high cost of debt for the industry.
397
   
The UK’s Limited Partnership Act provides for the rights and obligations of the partners and 
requires that all LPs be treated equally. However, in SA, each LP negotiates the terms of the 
partnership agreements. The terms may be different from those stated in the private equity fund’s 
constitution and it becomes a challenge to keep the investors equal. In this regard, South African 
investors have a crucial task of exercising pre-investment and post-investment due diligence. It is 
essential for LPs to understand the terms they are supposed to be negotiating, and agreeing to, for 
them to receive the best deal.
398
 LPs may consider using the general most favoured nation 
provision. This is a provision that ‘allows the investor to take the benefit of any terms given to 
all investors, or to other investors who have the same amount invested in the fund.’399 The side 
letter becomes crucial because it contains terms that have been granted other LPs and which may 
be useful to the investor. As a result in SA, LPs such as retirement funds can arrange their 
investments according to their own terms. Such flexibility may bring protection to other 
investors or alternatively make private equity prone to governance risks that my affect smaller 
classes of investors. 
                                               
395  Cassim FHI et al The Law Of Business Structure (2012) 21. 
396  Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
397 Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
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In en commandite partnerships a LP is undisclosed and occupies the position of a partner only 
insofar as the co-partners are concerned, but not in regard to outsiders.
400
 The requirement for all 
LPs to be registered and disclosed under the UK’s Limited Partnerships Act is a very useful tool 
for the regulators to monitor ongoing activities and also ensure that LPs do not participate in the 
management of the fund. The FSB in SA has not issued a list of permitted LPs’ activities in PEIs 
as in other states.
401
 While the South African legal structure seeks to protect LPs, it creates an 
obscure system with regard to the participation of LPs in PEIs. In this regard, the laws and 
regulations in the UK offer more transparency.  
Unlike public companies, en commandite partnerships do not trade on the JSE and are not 
registered and therefore the investors are not guaranteed of the same protection of transparency, 
corporate governance and accountability that is extended by the Companies Act.
402
 This might 
negatively affect the attractiveness of the private equity industry to risk-averse investors who 
value clarity, transparency and disclosure. Although, the advantages of private equity funds not 
being listed include the lesser public disclosure and the related reduced costs, PEIs may fail to 
attract investors who prefer to, or are required to, invest only in listed securities
403
 In the UK, 
various private equity funds are listed on the stock exchange and listed PEIs are deemed highly 
liquid and tradeable. In addition, settlement is guaranteed through the regulated stock exchange.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
New investors could be attracted to the South African private equity industry by building on and 
enhancing the provisions of the FAIS Act. Consequently, in order for the private equity industry 
to remain competitive and attractive to investors, the regulatory environment in SA needs to 
evolve in line with international trends. The Codes of the B-BBEE Act could be fine-tuned to 
seal loopholes that may negatively affect investor confidence. There is room for improvement in 
the common law features on the structure of en commandite partnerships, especially with regards 
to issues of clarity and transparency. The listed private equity structures are generally regarded 
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as being less risky as they are subject to greater regulation than unlisted companies. The 
foregoing discussion has shown that more could still be done to ensure the competitiveness of 
the private equity industry in SA. The next chapter provides some recommendations for 
improving PEIs performance in SA, most of which will target issues raised in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 CONCLUSION 
The main PEIs legal structures in SA include the bewind trusts, en commandite partnerships and 
companies ‘whose assets and liabilities are limited to the assets and liabilities arising from their 
private equity investments’.404 The en commandite partnerships are now the major and popular 
structures as they are operated in accordance with global trends with regards to the regulation of 
the fund and limitation of the LPs’ liability.405 There is no single or specific statute regulating 
activities of private equity funds. On the contrary, there are separate pieces of legislation and 
regulatory rules
406
 that include the FAIS Act,
407
 the B-BBEE Act
408
 and the BEE policy 
framework, the Companies Act,
409
 the PFA,
410
 the FMA,
411
 the Regulations, the Competition 
Act,
412
 the JSE Listing Requirements, and the King Reports on Corporate Governance.
413
 The 
challenge is how to harmonise these regulatory instruments so that a consolidated framework for 
regulating PEIs is developed.  
Internationally, PEIs are now subject to stricter standards and are developing into more 
transparent investments. The more dynamic jurisdictions, such as the UK, have moved from the 
conservative common law tradition and now include co-regulation in the regulation of PEIs. The 
UK has also incorporated the European Union’s AIFM Directive and its regulatory framework 
has continued to evolve through the significant authority of the FCA with its credible deterrence 
                                               
404 Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com 
(accessed 19 November 2014). 
405 Bowman Gilfillan Private equity Africa yearbook 2013/14 2ed (2014) 23. 
406 Modise L, Makola M & Van Zuylen C ‘The private equity-South Africa’ available at www.gettingthedeal.com 
 (accessed 19 November 2014). 
407 Act 37 of 2002. 
408 Act 53 of 2003. 
409 Act 71 of 2008. 
410 Act 24 of 1956. 
411 Act 19 of 2012. 
412
  Act 89 of 1998. 
413  Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
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strategy. In addition, the co-regulatory framework of the Walker Guidelines in the UK upholds 
transparency and disclosure of PEIs.  
 
Effective regulation of the private equity funds in SA can make the investments more 
transparent, enhance the attractiveness of the industry and ultimately facilitate the industry to 
contribute more to the economy. It would also protect all stakeholders of PEIs and investee 
companies. Strategic regulation of the funds can ensure that the asset class expands through 
enhanced investor confidence in the investment models, plans and services. In addition, by 
allowing progressive skills transfer, SA can address the previously economically disadvantaged 
without compromising on merit of management and ultimately investor confidence. The 
amended Codes of Best Practice of the B-BBEE that aim to promote black management of 
private equity funds through the B-BBEE Act, if not continuously monitored and effectively 
enforced, may create further loopholes within the funds themselves as well as compromise their 
international competitiveness.  
 
By drawing lessons from the regulation of PEIs in the UK, other successful PEI industries and 
through self-analysis, the South African private equity industry can develop a consolidated and 
facilitative regulatory framework. This can be based on co-regulation crafted along the lines of 
the Walker Guidelines (which encourage disclosure and transparency) as well as a consolidated 
Act to regulate the legal structure of en commandite partnerships and deal with wanton and/or 
unexplained non-compliance. This model of co-regulation has the potential to improve PEIs 
performance in SA as it combines the benefits of legal certainty with the flexibility and 
acceptance of co-regulation, making private equity funds attractive to both investors and investee 
companies. The following recommendations may help SA develop an improved regulatory 
framework for the private equity industry. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
In general, PEIs are high risk (credit, market and liquidity risks) investments. They usually form 
‘a part of the asset allocation of those portfolios that aim to make capital gains through higher 
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risk and higher return investments.’414 The huge amounts of capital outlay involved demand 
supportive regulatory and corporate governance measures. The main reason for ‘regulatory 
intervention is to protect investors from manipulation, promote regulatory responsibilities, and 
enable a better understanding of the advantages and limitations of investor-owned, privately 
pooled funds.’415 In SA there has generally been a shift towards imposing tremendous discipline 
on the boards of directors of investee companies and managers of funds while the private equity 
funds themselves often remain opaque and complex. When there is excessive regulation of the 
private equity industry it can negatively affect capital market efficiency and encourage funds to 
move to more lightly regulated jurisdictions.
416
 On the other hand, too little regulation can also 
reduce market confidence in the South African capital markets.
417
 Therefore the following 
recommendations are suggested in an effort to strike a balance between excessive control and 
inadequate regulation with a view to improving market confidence in the private equity industry. 
The recommendations suggested pertain to the private equity industry guidelines, the B-BBEE 
Act, regulation of the PEIs, and listing of more PEIs on the JSE. 
 
6.2.1 Industry guidelines 
It is recommended that SAVCA, as the industry’s regulating body, should set up a soft law 
framework and industry guidelines that can be compared to those that regulate companies on the 
JSE. The co-regulatory framework would inform expected behaviour and best practice, as a way 
of regulating the industry. It would draw from the G20 recommendations,
418
 the AIFM Directive, 
the Dodd-Frank Act in the USA, and the Walker Guidelines in the UK. SAVCA could reinforce 
the guidelines by actively monitoring and reviewing them regularly. Co-regulation of this nature 
would be similar to the King Reports on Corporate Governance but would provide codes of best 
practice that are specific to PEIs. The framework would be specifically tailor-made to address 
the evolving obligations of the private equity industry especially with regards to disclosing in 
time the performance of funds and transparent management procedures. If the guidelines can 
                                               
414  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag 223.  
415  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag 223. 
416  Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
417  Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
418  G20 G20 Working Group 1 Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency (2009). 
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function along the lines of the Walker Guidelines, they will address such issues as ‘the valuation 
of the funds’ investments, detailed financial accounts, communication to all stakeholders of the 
governance approach and the type of investment in investee firms as well as ‘structure’ and 
amount of debt’.419 The management and shareholders of portfolio companies would also 
disclose their decision-making powers and loan agreements.
420
 As is the case with the Walker 
Guidelines, GPs would be required to publish annual reviews that are accessible on their 
websites, which would enable investors to understand more about the activities of PEIs.
421
 In 
addition, PEIs could give a breakdown of management fees or carried interest to SAVCA as the 
independent oversight body. 
  
6.2.2 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (B-BBEE Act) of 2003 
 
The B-BBEE Act ‘equity ownership requirements have generally proved challenging for 
multinational companies in SA with regard to disposing of an equity interest in their local 
operations.’ 422 In recognition of this, there have been exceptions for multinationals, such as, 
Hewlett Packard, that permit them to ‘invest in equity equivalent programmes or dispose of a 
stake in the offshore parent company.’423 Ultimately, Hewlett Packard set up the HP Business 
Institute for the purpose of skills development as an equity equivalent programme. Similarly, in 
relation to PEIs, more lenient programmes on skills development and ownership structures could 
strengthen the performance of the industry. While affirmative action is essential, SA has come of 
age and is able to have management systems that are based on merit and do not only increase 
investor confidence but are also international competitiveness. A fund manager that fails to 
establish a favourable track record may consequently fail to attract investors or take part in 
investment consortiums with other private equity funds. Investment acumen is an essential factor 
in handling collective funds as the livelihood of ordinary citizens, such as, pensioners depends on 
it. In addition, a gradual process of identifying broader, barriers to the advancement of the 
                                               
419  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag 223.  
420  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag 221. 
421  Addleshaw Goddard ‘The Walker Guidelines for disclosure and transparency in private equity’ available at   
http://www.addleshawgoddard.com/asset_store/document/walker_guidelines_-_checklist_95735.pdf  (accessed 25  
February 2015). 
422  Davids E & Hale A Mergers and Acquisitions Review (2012) 4. 
423  Davids E & Hale A Mergers and Acquisitions Review (2012) 4. 
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previously disadvantaged groups that also allows skills transfer is required for the industry to 
remain internationally competitive.  According to Anthea Jeffery
424
 this would mean that the 
South African regulators could continuously improve education; free the ‘labour market from 
excessive regulation and end other damaging dirigisme invention to make SA much more 
attractive to direct investors, both local and foreign.’425 The sustainable correlation of the PEIs 
and the B-BBEE objectives is imperative as the impact of the B-BBEE Act is ‘arguably more 
significant in private equity than in the listed company environment.’426 
 
6.2.3 Regulation of the private equity legal structure 
 
The en commandite partnership is akin to the limited liability partnership used in PEIs 
internationally and it is essential for SA to maintain this legal structure in order to be in 
conformity with international standards.
427
 Accordingly, there is no real need to amend South 
Africa’s en commandite partnerships. However, there is need to develop a regulatory framework 
to control the activities of the legal structure in the country. Therefore it is suggested that en 
commandite partnerships should be registered with the Registrar of Companies to ensure vital 
information on all investors is filed with the FSB. The FSB could share vital details only with the 
relevant authorities in order to ensure that effective oversight is maintained, particularly when a 
fund is located in a jurisdiction different to that of the manager.
428
 The advantage of such 
regulation is that if the government would decide that a private equity fund has grown too large 
and is too risky; the fund could be placed under stricter supervision by the FSB.
429
 
 
For all the above mentioned reasons, consolidating the fragmented legislation on PEIs is required 
in order to regulate en commandite partnerships and ultimately all privately pooled funds trading 
as PEIs and hedge funds in SA. Learning from the Limited Partnerships Act of the UK, the ‘new 
Act’ would regulate a number of issues that arise in the financial activities of en commandite 
                                               
424  Jeffery A ‘BEE is flawed and should be scrapped’ Mail and Guardian 18 January 2013. 
425  Jeffery A ‘BEE is flawed and should be scrapped’ Mail and Guardian 18 January 2013.  
426   Missankov I, Van Dyk R & Van Biljon M et al. ‘Is private equity a suitable investment for South African pension   
funds?’ available at    
http://www.itinews.co.za/content/media/companydocs/5f9cc53b-ddf5-4041-8151-2ced3b412681.pdf (accessed 08  
November 2014). 
427  Bowman Gilfillan Private equity Africa yearbook 2013/14 2 ed (2014) 23. 
428  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag 220. 
429  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag 220. 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
partnerships and ultimately PEIs. It is suggested that ‘the Act’ should provide for the registration 
of funds with the FSB so that the relationship between the LPs and the GPs does not just depend 
on explicit contractual arrangements. At the moment only fund managers are registered and 
regulated by the FSB, in accordance with the FAIS Act, but it is also essential for the FSB to 
have a record of investors and to monitor their activities in the funds. The registration statement 
would be required to be signed by both general and limited
430
 partners and submitted to the 
Registrar of Companies. Details of the names of all of LPs and the capital contributions of the LP 
would be submitted, and the information would be publicly available at the FSB.
431
 This would 
increase transparency and help potential investors make informed decisions. More importantly, 
the ‘new Act’ would provide for the rights and obligations of the partners and require that all LPs 
be treated equally. The ‘new Act’ could also codify some common law provisions, such as, a 
requirement that an investor’s capital may not be returned prior to the termination of the en 
commandite partnership. The reporting and disclosure requirements on portfolio companies may 
also need to be provided for in the regulations. However, transaction information that is sensitive 
and confidential would only be shared with the regulatory authorities. 
 
An Act regulating en commandite partnerships could consolidate all the fragmented regulations 
of private equity funds that emanate from the common law and legislation, and harmonise these 
regulatory instruments. These include the FAIS Act,
432
 the B-BBEE Act,
433
 and the BEE policy 
framework, the Companies Act,
434
 the PFA,
435
 the FMA,
436
 the Exchange Control Regulations 
1961, the Competition Act,
437
 the JSE Listing Requirements and the King Reports on Corporate 
Governance. In addition, the ‘new Act’ could also incorporate regulations that recognise regional 
ties and multinational agreements, along the lines of the EU’s AIFM Directive. A shift towards a 
proactive, risk management approach through early intervention and enforcement could also be 
an important dimension in PEIs regulation. 
  
                                               
430 Section 8 UK Limited Partnerships Act 1907. 
431
 Sections 3, 8 and 9 UK Limited Partnerships Act 1907. 
432 Act 37 of 2002. 
433 Act 53 of 2003. 
434 Act 71 of 2008. 
435 Act 24 of 1956. 
436  Act 19 of 2012. 
437
  Act 89 of 1998. 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
It is recommended that new legislation that regulates en commandite partnerships addresses 
challenges surrounding partnerships in SA particularly as a result of not having a separate legal 
persona. A ‘new Act’ can provide for litigation, insolvency, value added tax and procedural law 
with regards to en commandite partnerships. En commandite partnerships also need clear 
provisions on the ownership of economic risk to avoid ‘costly barriers for lenders when they 
negotiate settlements.’438  
6.2.4 Listing private equity funds 
It is recommended that private equity firms be listed on the JSE including venture capital funds, 
buyout funds and development capital funds.
439
 The current global trend is that PEIs are in 
search of more stable capital markets and are increasingly raising funds by listing on ‘public   
markets.’ 440 The key benefits of listing are: increased liquidity for investors as they are able to 
trade their interests on the listed market, and that the fund will have access to investors who 
prefer to, or are required to, invest only in listed securities. In addition, the listed private equity 
structures are generally regarded as being less risky as they are subject to greater regulation than 
unlisted companies. The disadvantages of PEIs being listed include increased public disclosure 
and the related additional costs. However, it is anticipated that the disadvantages will be 
outweighed by the benefits mentioned above. 
 
In sum, excessive regulatory measures could be unappealing to both investors and private equity 
fund managers, and would certainly impede the growth of the private equity market. Co-
regulation of PEIs can allow, if well considered, appropriate control of privately pooled funds. In 
addition, a new consolidated Act for regulating PEI legal structures is required to provide 
sanctions in those difficult cases where co-regulation falls short legally. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
438  Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
439 Financial Services Authority Discussion paper 06/06 ‘Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory  
engagement’ (2006) available at www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp06_06pdf (accessed 18 February 2015). 
440  McCahery AJ & Vermeulen PME ‘Private equity regulation: a comparative analysis’ (2012) 16 J Manag 220. 
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